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Carbon taxes and emissions trading systems (ETSs) to limit 
emissions of greenhouse gases (GHGs) are increasingly common. At the 
end of 2015, 17 GHG ETSs were operational in 55 jurisdictions, and 18 
jurisdictions collected at least one carbon tax. This paper assesses the 
performance of carbon taxes and ETSs with respect to environmental 
effectiveness (reduction of emissions regulated by the instrument), cost-
effectiveness (marginal abatement cost), economic efficiency, public 
finance, and administrative issues. 
Data on emissions subject to carbon taxes are rarely reported. We 
estimate the taxed emissions for 17 taxes in 12 jurisdictions from 1991 
through the end of 2015. All 17 taxes have reduced emissions relative to 
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business-as-usual. Six of the jurisdictions actually reduced emissions, 
although in at least three of those jurisdictions the reductions appear to 
be due to other policies. The small sizes of reduction in almost all 17 
cases are partially due to the low tax rates; the modest and uncertain 
changes in tax rates over time; and the limited response of taxed sources, 
such as fossil fuels, to price changes. 
Actual emissions declined for at least six of 10 ETSs. Other policies 
and developments, such as the 2009 recession, contributed to the 
reductions, but estimates of the share of the reduction attributable to the 
instrument are rare. All of the ETSs have accumulated banks of surplus 
allowances and most have implemented measures to reduce these banks. 
On average, the marginal cost of compliance is substantially lower for 
ETSs than carbon taxes. 
ETS experience has been shared bilaterally and via dedicated 
institutions. As a result, most ETSs have increased the share of 
allowances auctioned; adopted declining emissions caps; specified future 
caps and floor prices several years into the future; shifted to 
benchmarking for free allowance allocations to emissions-intensive, 
trade-exposed (EITE) sources; reduced accessibility to foreign offset 
credits; and established market stability reserves. By contrast, there is 
little evidence of shared learning and virtually no change to the design of 
carbon taxes. We found no jurisdiction that routinely tracks the taxed 
emissions. Very few jurisdictions regularly assess the effectiveness of the 
tax in achieving emission reductions. Additionally, adjustments to the 
tax rate often are unpredictable after an introductory period of three to 
five years. 
Both instruments reduce emissions, but ETSs have performed 
better than carbon taxes on the principal criteria of environmental 
effectiveness and cost-effectiveness. Many jurisdictions have 
implemented both a carbon tax and a GHG ETS, and every jurisdiction 
that has adopted either instrument has also implemented other policies. 
More research is needed to improve the design of both instruments and 
their interaction with non-market-based carbon policies because the use 
of multiple instruments produces complex interactive and distributional 
effects. While economically inefficient, market-based policies should be 
supplemented by non-market-based policies to ensure sustained political 
support. 
INTRODUCTION 
Whether carbon taxes or greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions 
trading systems (ETSs) are more effective at reducing GHG emissions 
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has been widely debated in climate policy literature.1 Lacking from this 
debate is empirical evidence documenting the performance of these 
instruments. This paper fills the gap by providing such evidence. 
Economic theory indicates that pricing 2  GHG 3  emissions can 
minimize the cost to society of reducing emissions and so mitigating 
climate change. Carbon taxes and ETSs are two ways to price GHG 
emissions. A carbon tax imposes a price—the tax rate specified by the 
government—on each metric ton of GHGs emitted, measured as 
metric ton of carbon dioxide equivalent (tCO2e), but does not limit 
overall emissions.4 A cap-and-trade system—the most common form 
of ETS—imposes a government-established limit on aggregate GHG 
emissions by specified sources, distributes tradable allowances (usually 
one tCO2e each) approximately equal to the limit, and requires 
regulated emitters to submit allowances equal to their actual 
emissions.5 The market determines the price for allowances and thus 
the price per tCO2e emitted. A baseline-and-credit system—a less 
common form of ETS—specifies an absolute emissions or emissions 
intensity limit for each participant and allocates tradable credits 
(“allowances”) to emitters who emit less than their limits. Emitters that 
exceed their limits can purchase credits from other participants to 
cover the excess emissions. Again, the market determines the price per 
tCO2e emitted. 
 
 
 1.  See, e.g., SHI-LING HSU, THE CASE FOR A CARBON TAX: GETTING PAST OUR HANG-
UPS TO EFFECTIVE CLIMATE POLICY 5–7 (2012); WORLD BANK P’SHIP FOR MARKET 
READINESS, CARBON TAX GUIDE: A HANDBOOK FOR POLICY MAKERS 34 (2017); Michael 
Goldblatt, Comparison of Emissions Trading and Carbon Taxation in South Africa, 10 CLIMATE 
POL’Y 511, 512–13 (2011); Michael G. Pollitt, A Global Carbon Market? 7 (Energy Pol’y Research 
Grp., Univ. Cambridge, Working Paper No. 1608, 2016). 
 2.  See, e.g., Andrea Baranzini et al., Carbon Pricing in Climate Policy: Seven Reasons, 
Complementary Instruments, and Political Economy Considerations, 8 WIRES CLIMATE 
CHANGE, Dec. 2017, 3–6 [hereinafter Seven Reasons]. 
 3.  There are numerous GHGs. Carbon dioxide (CO2) is the most voluminous and least 
potent. Emissions of other GHGs are often measured in terms of tons of CO2 equivalence 
(tCO2e) usually based on their radiative forcing relative to CO2 over 100 years. See SUSAN 
SOLOMON ET AL., INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 
2007: THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS 33 (2007). 
 4.  A carbon tax is a tax per tCO2e applied to fossil fuels and/or GHG emitting activities. 
In this paper, taxes on fossil fuels not related to the GHG emissions due to combustion of the fuel 
are not considered to be carbon taxes. 
 5.  The quantity of allowances distributed may be less than the established limit because 
some allowances may be withheld for various purposes, such as allocations to new entrants, or 
because they are not purchased at allowance auctions. Allowances in excess of the cap may be 
distributed as transitional mechanisms, such as credit for early action, or to limit price increases 
when allowance prices exceed specified thresholds. 
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A carbon tax and an ETS would yield identical results for 
equivalent emission reductions if there is no uncertainty regarding 
future prices, perfect competition in all markets, no interaction with 
other policies, and universal coverage (all sources of GHG emissions). 
In practice, the performance of carbon taxes differs from that of ETSs 
because these assumptions never hold. In a given jurisdiction, various 
factors including taxation authority, the emissions profile, and 
influence of large emitters can affect the choice and design of an 
instrument. Thus, the designs of carbon taxes and GHG ETSs, as well 
as their performance, vary across jurisdictions. 
The performance of a carbon tax or ETS as implemented is further 
affected by some of the jurisdiction’s other emissions-related policies, 
such as fuel taxes, energy efficiency standards, and renewable energy 
incentives.6 External factors, such as economic recessions, fossil fuel 
prices, and natural disasters, 7  can affect the emission reductions 
achieved by a tax or ETS.8 
This paper assesses the performance of carbon taxes and GHG 
ETSs operational at the end of 2015.9 These instruments are assessed 
for environmental effectiveness (reduction of actual emissions), cost-
effectiveness (marginal abatement cost), economic efficiency, public 
finance, and administrative issues. We do not make any causal claims 
between the observed emission reductions in a jurisdiction and its 
choice of policy instrument because, as noted above, many other 
factors affect actual emissions. The data and resources needed to 
disentangle the contribution of the instrument from the other factors 
were not available for this research. Nevertheless, useful insights can 
be drawn about the performance of the carbon taxes and GHG ETSs 
implemented to date. 
 
 6.  See generally OECD, INTERACTIONS BETWEEN EMISSION TRADING SYSTEMS AND 
OTHER OVERLAPPING POLICY INSTRUMENTS (2011) (describing interactions between emissions 
trading schemes and other policy tools); Baranzini et al., supra note 2, at 6–7. 
 7.  See, e.g., Martin Fackler, Nuclear Power Nears Standstill for the Japanese, N.Y. TIMES, 
Mar. 8, 2012, at A1 (describing dip in nuclear power production after Fukushima earthquake and 
tsunami). 
 8.  For example, the economic recession of 2009 reduced GHG emissions by sources subject 
to several carbon taxes (see Annex 1). A decline in natural gas prices in the US due to shale gas 
production led to fuel switching and lower emissions by Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative 
(RGGI) participants. Brian C. Murray & Peter T. Maniloff, Why Have Greenhouse Emissions in 
RGGI States Declined? An Econometric Attribution to Economic, Energy Market, and Policy 
Factors, 51 ENERGY ECON. 581, 583–84 (2015). 
 9.   Taxes and ETSs that are no longer operational, such as Australia’s carbon pricing 
mechanism that was repealed in 2014 are not included in the analysis. Clean Energy Legislation 
(Carbon Tax Repeal) Act 2014 (Austl.) (repealing the Clean Energy Act 2011). 
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The performance of many of the instruments implemented has 
been assessed from several different perspectives and with varying 
degrees of rigor, including those implemented by Alberta, British 
Columbia, California, Denmark, European Union ETS, Finland, 
Ireland, New Zealand, Norway, Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative 
(RGGI), Sweden, and Switzerland. 10  In addition to assessments of 
individual instruments, a few studies review the performance of 
multiple instruments including the seven Chinese pilot ETSs,11 ETSs 
for GHGs and other pollutants,12 carbon taxes in multiple European 
countries, 13  and carbon taxes and GHG ETSs in eighteen 
jurisdictions.14 
This article proceeds as follows. Section I identifies the carbon 
taxes and GHG ETSs implemented before the end of 2015. Section II 
discusses the effect of real-world considerations on instrument choice 
and design. Criteria to evaluate the instruments are proposed in 
Section III. The changes in emissions subject to the carbon taxes and 
GHG ETSs implemented to-date are summarized in Sections IV and 
V, respectively. Our assessment of the performance of these 
instruments in practice appears in Section VI. Section VII concludes. 
I. CARBON TAXES AND GHG ETSS IMPLEMENTED BY THE END OF 
2015 
Our analysis is limited to the instruments operational at the end of 
2015 because sufficient data to assess the performance of more recently 
implemented instruments are not available. Subsequent market-based 
emissions policy implementations include carbon taxes adopted in 
Alberta (Canada), Chile, and Columbia in 2017 and ETSs 
 
 10.  Summaries of the assessments are provided in section IV.B for taxes and section V.C for 
ETSs. 
 11.  See generally Zhe Deng et al., Effectiveness of Pilot Carbon Emissions Trading Systems 
in China, 18 CLIMATE POL’Y 992 (2018); Jun Dong et al., From Pilot to the National Emissions 
Trading Scheme in China: International Practice and Domestic Experiences, 8 SUSTAINABILITY 
522 (2016); Maosheng Duan et al., Review of Carbon Emissions Trading Pilots in China, 25 
ENERGY & ENV. 527 (2014); Junjie Zhang et al., Lessons Learned from China’s Regional Carbon 
Market Pilots, 6 ECON. ENERGY & ENVTL. POL’Y 1 (2017). 
 12.  See generally Richard Schmalensee & Robert N. Stavins, Lessons Learned from Three 
Decades of Experience with Cap-and-Trade, 11 REV. ENVTL. ECON. & POL’Y 59 (2017). 
 13.  See generally TORBEN MIDEKSA & STEFFEN KALLBEKKEN, CTR. FOR INT’L CLIMATE 
AND ENVTL. RESEARCH, THE ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTIVENESS OF CARBON TAXES; Mikael 
Skou Andersen, Europe’s Experience with Carbon-Energy Taxation, 3 S.A.P.I.EN.S, Dec. 2010; 
Boqiang Lin & Xuehui Li, The Effect of Carbon Tax on Per Capita CO2 Emissions, 39 ENERGY 
POL’Y 5137 (2011). 
 14.  See EASWARAN NARASSIMHAN ET AL., CARBON PRICING IN PRACTICE: A REVIEW OF 
THE EVIDENCE (Climate Policy Lab, The Fletcher Sch., Tufts Univ., No. 015, 2017). 
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implemented in Fuijan (China) in 2016 and Ontario (Canada) in 2017. 
Among them, Alberta’s ETS—the Specified Gas Emitters Regulation 
(SGER)—has been replaced by an updated emissions intensity 
baseline and credit ETS;15 the Ontario ETS was terminated by a new 
provincial government in 2018; 16  and though British Columbia 
(Canada) has passed legislation that enables the establishment of a 
baseline-and-credit ETS, the system has not yet been operationalized. 
17 
At the end of 2015,  GHG ETSs were operational in 55 
jurisdictions (34 national and 21 sub-national),18 and 18 jurisdictions 
(17 national and one sub-national) collected at least one carbon tax. 
Table 1 lists these jurisdictions and their policy instruments.19 ETSs 
were implemented in a greater number of jurisdictions and covered a 
greater percentage of priced emissions than carbon taxes. Of the 6,059 
MtCO2e annual emissions covered by a carbon price at the end of 2015, 
ETSs covered 4,286 MtCO2e (71%), while carbon taxes covered 1,773 
MtCO2e (29%). 20  Although ETSs are more common, they were 
adopted much later than carbon taxes. The first carbon taxes were 
adopted in 1990, while the first GHG ETS still in effect was not 
implemented until 2005. 
The average share of a jurisdiction’s emissions covered by an ETS 
(48.0%) is a little higher than the average for a carbon tax (45.7%).21 
The share of emissions covered ranges from 18% to 85% for ETSs and 
from 3% to 70% for carbon taxes. The average tax rate (USD 13.04 
 
 15.  Sharon Mascher, Striving for Equivalency Across the Alberta, British Columbia, Ontario 
and Québec Carbon Pricing Systems: The Pan-Canadian Carbon Pricing Benchmark, 18 CLIMATE 
POL’Y 1012, 1015 (2018). As of 2017, the fixed price compliance option under the revised system 
was CAD 30, the price shown in Table 1. As this paper focuses on ETSs operational in 2015, 
unless otherwise specified, statements relating to Alberta’s ETS refer to the SGER. Id. 
 16.  Id. 
 17.  Id. 
 18.  The EU ETS covers 31 national jurisdictions (the 28 member states plus Iceland, 
Norway and Liechtenstein) and RGGI covers nine American states (Connecticut, Delaware, 
Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New York, Rhode Island, and Vermont). 
 19.  Although not listed by the sources used for Table 1, Croatia has applied a carbon tax to 
emissions by large stationary sources since 2007. The tax was revised to exclude sources covered 
by the EU ETS when Croatia joined in 2013. In addition, since July 2013, New Zealand has 
imposed a levy on imports, such as air conditioners, that contain synthetic GHGs. Bulk imports 
of synthetic GHGs are covered by the ETS. N.Z. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, 2017 SYNTHETIC 
GREENHOUSE GAS LEVY REPORT (2017). 
 20.  MtCO2e is equal to one million tCO2e. 
 21.  These are weighted averages; the share for each jurisdiction is weighted by the emissions 
covered by the instrument in that jurisdiction. The average tax rates and allowance prices are 
calculated in the same way. 
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/tCO2e) is over 65% higher than the average ETS allowance price 
(USD 7.79 /tCO2e). Furthermore, the range of tax rates—from less 
than USD 1 to USD 140—is much broader than the range of allowance 
prices—from less than USD 1 to USD 24. 
Most of the jurisdictions with a carbon tax also have an ETS, 
usually covering different sources. Fourteen of the countries with a 
carbon tax participate in the EU ETS.22 Switzerland and Alberta, since 
2018, also have both a tax and an ETS. 23  As noted above, British 
Columbia has passed legislation to establish a baseline-and-credit ETS 
to complement its carbon tax, but this system currently is not 
operational.24 Japan and Mexico only have taxes.25 South Korea, as 
well as all sub-national jurisdictions other than Alberta and British 
Columbia, only have an ETS.26 
 
 22.  Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Iceland, Ireland, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Norway, 
Poland, Portugal, Slovenia, Sweden, and the UK. 
 23.  For Switzerland, see NARASSIMHAN ET AL., supra note 14, at 6–7. For Alberta, see 
Mascher, supra note 15, at 1013. 
 24.  Mascher, supra note 15, at 1015. 
 25.  Mexico will start an ETS simulation in preparation of its pilot ETS launch in 2018. 
WORLD BANK, STATE AND TRENDS OF CARBON PRICING 2017 11 (2017). 
 26.  INT’L CARBON ACTION P’SHIP (“ICAP”), EMISSIONS TRADING WORLDWIDE: STATUS 
REPORT 2018 (Johannes Ackva et al. eds., 2017), https://icapcarbonaction.com/en/publications 
[hereinafter, EMISSIONS TRADING WORLDWIDE]. 
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Table 1. Information on Carbon Taxes and GHG Emissions Trading 
Systems in Operation at the end of 201527  
 
 27.  August 2017 prices are from WORLD BANK, supra note 25. Shares of emissions covered 
are from CLÉMENT MÉTIVIER ET AL., GLOBAL PANORAMA OF CARBON PRICES IN 2017 3 (2017), 
https://www.i4ce.org/publications-2/. For the EU and national jurisdictions, the emissions covered 
by the instrument are calculated from national emissions excluding LULUCF for 2016 reported 
by the UNFCCC Greenhouse Gas Inventory and the share of emissions covered by the 
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II. INSTRUMENT CHOICE AND DESIGN REFLECT REAL WORLD 
CONSIDERATIONS 
A variety of legal, political, and economic factors influence the 
choice and design of a jurisdiction’s emissions policy. Constitutional 
authority or political considerations may limit the instrument choices. 
Members of the European Union and European Economic Area, for 
example, must join the EU ETS. 28  In California, an ETS is more 
politically feasible because it only requires 50% of the legislature to 
approve, compared to two thirds of the legislature when it comes to 
taxes.29 
Administrative feasibility also plays a role in a jurisdiction’s choice 
of policy instruments. An ETS needs administrative infrastructure, 
including an allowance registry and allowance market supervision, 
while much of the infrastructure needed by a tax may already exist. An 
ETS also requires a competitive market for allowances, meaning a 
large number of participants with no dominant firms. Thus, a carbon 
tax may be better suited to a small jurisdiction or a developing country 
with limited administrative capacity. In some cases, a small jurisdiction 
can address these issues by joining an ETS covering multiple 
jurisdictions. Examples include Malta in the EU ETS and New 
Hampshire in the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI). 
 
 
instrument. Greenhouse Gas Inventory Data—Detailed Data by Party, UN FRAMEWORK 
CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE, http://di.unfccc.int/detailed_data_by_party. For Alberta, 
British Columbia, and Quebec, total emissions for 2016 are from ENV’T. & CLIMATE CHANGE 
CANADA, NATIONAL INVENTORY REPORT 1990–2016—GREENHOUSE GAS SOURCES AND 
SINKS: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 6 (2018). California total emissions for 2016 are from CAL AIR 
RESOURCES BD, CALIFORNIA GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS FOR 2000–2016 1 (2018). For other 
GHG ETSs, the emissions covered are from the ICAP fact sheets for the respective systems in 
ICAP, supra note 26. 
 28.  For a description of the legislative process governing the EU ETS and its 
implementation by member states, see EUROPEAN COMM’N, EU ETS HANDBOOK 9–11 (2015). 
Article 4 of Directive 2003/87/EC establishing the EU ETS, requires Member States to ensure 
that, from January 1, 2005, no installation undertakes any activity listed in Annex I of the 
Directive resulting in emissions specified in relation to that activity unless its operator holds a 
permit issued by a competent authority. Council Directive 87/EC, art. 4, 2003 O.J. (L275/32) (EC). 
 29.  Guri Bang et al., California’s Cap-and-Trade System: Diffusion and Lessons, 17 GLOBAL 
ENVTL. POL. 12, 26 (2017) (“California law requires a two-thirds legislative majority for the 
passage of new taxes, but ‘regulatory fees’ require only a simple majority.”). Opponents 
challenged the ETS on the ground that the auction revenue was a tax, but this argument was 
unsuccessful. See, e.g., Cal. Chamber of Commerce v. State Air Res. Bd., 10 Cal. App. 5th 604, 
649–50 (2017). Legislation to extend the ETS to 2030 was passed with a greater than two-thirds 
majority. Zeke Hausfather, Explainer: California’s New ‘Cap-and-Trade’ Scheme to Cut 
Emissions, CARBONBRIEF (July 28, 2017, 1:35 PM), https://www.carbonbrief.org/explainer-
californias-new-cap-and-trade-scheme-to-cut-emissions. 
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Conceptually, a carbon tax imposes a uniform tax per tCO2e 
emitted. In practice, a carbon tax is usually implemented as a series of 
taxes on various fossil fuels and emitting activities.30 Tax rates of USD 
0.0259 per liter of diesel and USD 0.0202 per m3 of natural gas, for 
example, both correspond to a tax of USD 10/tCO2.31 As in Finland and 
Sweden, the tax rate per tCO2e may differ by fuel and activity. Any tax 
on fossil fuels can be expressed in terms of a tax per tCO2e based on 
the carbon content of the fuel.32 This results in disagreements as to 
whether a tax is a carbon tax, including India’s tax on coal, the UK’s 
fossil fuel levy and climate change levy, and the taxes adopted by the 
Netherlands in 1996.33 A carbon tax raises additional implementation 
issues such as coverage, tax base, reporting requirements, and use of 
revenue. For example, emissions-intensive, trade-exposed (EITE) 
installations may be tax exempt or be eligible for refunds. Taxpayers 
typically are required to report the quantity of each fuel/activity subject 
to the tax and the tax payable, but not the associated emissions.34 
Existing ETSs, with the exception of New Zealand, use one of two 
basic designs. The more common cap-and-trade design, such as the EU 
ETS, imposes a government-established cap on aggregate GHG 
emissions by specified sources, distributes tradable allowances (1 
tCO2e each) approximately equal to the cap, and requires regulated 
emitters to submit allowances or other compliance units equal to their 
actual emissions.35 Under the baseline-and-credit design, such as the 
 
 30.  WORLD BANK P’SHIP FOR MARKET READINESS, supra note 1, at 10. 
 31.  When fossil fuel is burned, virtually all of the carbon is emitted as CO2, so it is possible 
to express the tax on CO2 emissions as an equivalent tax on the carbon content of the fuel. See, 
e.g., 2016 Carbon Conversion Factors, CARBON FOOTPRINT (2016), 
https://www.carbonfootprint.com/2016_carbon_conversion_factors.html. The UK government’s 
conversion factors for GHG reporting are 2.67620 kg CO2e per liter for 100% mineral diesel fuel 
and 2.02838 kg CO2e per cubic meter of natural gas (“Fuels” sheet). Thus, 373.6640 liters of diesel 
yield emissions of 1 tCO2e (1000 (kg/ton)/2.67620 (kg/liter)). Id. Similarly, 493.00365 cubic meters 
of natural gas yield emissions of 1 tCO2e. Id. A tax of USD 10/tCO2e therefore is equivalent to a 
tax of USD 0.02676 per liter of diesel fuel (USD 10/373.6640) and USD 0.020284 per cubic meter 
of natural gas). Id. 
 32.  See OECD, TAXING ENERGY USE 2018 27–35 (2018) (expressing the effective tax rate 
due to all taxes on a fuel in different countries in terms of the tax per tCO2e). 
 33.  The Dutch tax rates were USD 6.82/tCO2e for coal, USD 77.89 for light fuel oil, and 
USD 110.21 for natural gas thus creating an incentive to increase rather than reduce GHG 
emissions (use more coal rather than natural gas). See Érick Lachapelle, Energy Security and 
Climate Change Policy in the OECD: The Political Economy of Carbon-Energy Taxation 95, 
tbl.3.2.2 (2018) (unpublished Ph. D. dissertation, University of Toronto) (on file with journal). 
 34.  See, e.g., B.C. Ministry of Finance, Self Assessors’ Carbon Tax Return (Form FIN 112) 
(2018) (British Columbia carbon tax self-reporting return form). 
 35.  The quantity of allowances distributed may be less than or greater than the cap. For a 
detailed description of the EU ETS, see EUROPEAN COMM’N, supra note 28. 
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Tokyo ETS, the regulator sets an emissions limit for each participant. 
In practice, baseline-and-credit ETSs allocate free “allowances” to 
market participants: a participant whose actual emissions are below its 
limit receives tradable credits for the difference, while a participant 
whose emissions exceed its limit must submit purchased credits or 
other compliance units equal to its excess emissions.36 In this design, 
the emissions limit may be absolute or be determined by the 
participant’s output and an emissions intensity standard. ETSs of either 
type may differ in terms of other design features, including coverage, 
length of the compliance period, and price stability mechanisms. 
Many ETSs allow participants to use credits issued for emission 
reductions outside the coverage of the trading program (“offset 
credits” or “offsets”) for compliance.37 Those ETSs typically specify 
activities eligible to generate credits and limit the quantity of credits 
that may be used for compliance. Some ETSs restrict the use of offset 
credits to those generated in the same jurisdiction, while others allow 
the use of imported units.38 The Chinese pilots, for example, accept 
only offset credits generated by projects in China (Chinese Certified 
Emission Reductions, CCERs),39 and the EU ETS allows only credits 
issued by the Clean Development Mechanism or Joint Implementation 
mechanism subject to various qualitative and quantitative restrictions 
that have changed over time.40 
Once a jurisdiction selects an instrument, many design issues need 
to be resolved, especially the sources and emissions covered and the 
 
 36.  In effect, the sum of the limits of all participants is the cap on aggregate emissions. 
Changes to the participant population automatically adjust the cap on aggregate emissions. In 
contrast, in a “cap-and-trade” system, the cap usually is not adjusted for changes to the number 
of sources. 
 37.  See Erik Haites, Experience with Linking Greenhouse Gas Emissions Trading Systems, 
5 WIRES ENERGY ENV’T 246, 247 (2016) (“Two ETS are linked if a participant in one system can 
use an allowance or a credit (compliance instrument) issued by either system for compliance.”). 
 38.  Between 2008 and 2014, the New Zealand ETS allowed unlimited use of specified 
imported units. The Swiss ETS and EU ETS accepted imported units subject to qualitative and 
quantitative restrictions between 2008 and 2012.  See id. at tbls.1–3 (collecting data on the use of 
imported credits by the New Zealand, Swiss, and EU ETSs). The Chinese pilot trading programs 
only accept offset credits (CCERs) awarded for eligible emission reduction projects in China. 
DIMITRI DE BOER ET AL., CHINA CARBON FORUM, THE 2017 CHINA CARBON PRICING SURVEY 
4 n. 4 (2017). 
 39.  Deng et al., supra note 11, at 992. 
 40.  The Clean Development Mechanism and Joint Implementation are mechanisms 
established by the Kyoto Protocol that award internationally recognized credits for emission 
reductions achieved by projects in respectively developing and developed countries. For rules on 
the use of such credits by participants in the EU ETS, see EUROPEAN COMM’N, supra note 28, at 
96. 
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treatment of emissions-intensive, trade-exposed (EITE) installations 
that face competition from firms in jurisdictions with weaker (or no) 
policies to limit GHG emissions. All instruments exclude some 
emissions for administrative reasons—emissions that are difficult to 
measure, such as forests and agriculture, 41  and small emissions by 
numerous sources, such as emissions from landfills.42 Emissions may 
also be excluded for policy reasons, most often those of the agricultural 
sector. In practice, the share of a jurisdiction’s emissions covered 
ranges from 18% to 85% for ETSs and from 3% to 70% for taxes.43 
Imposing a carbon tax or ETS compliance obligation on an EITE 
firm can have adverse economic and environmental consequences. The 
instrument imposes a cost on the firm and makes it less competitive 
relative to similar firms in jurisdictions with weaker GHG emission 
limitation policies. Production and associated emissions may shift to 
the jurisdiction with the weaker policy (“leakage”), reducing the 
anticipated environmental benefits and imposing economic costs on 
the jurisdiction implementing the more stringent policy. 44  Thus, 
virtually all instruments have provisions to protect EITE firms. In the 
case of taxes, provisions include exemptions, differential tax rates, 
rebates, and other support. 45  With an ETS, protective provisions 
include free allowances (emissions limit in a baseline and credit 
system) and rebates.46 
Furthermore, almost all ETSs include some price stability 
provisions to alleviate the uncertainty of emitters’ compliance cost.47 
 
 41.  The New Zealand ETS is an exception. It includes forests and requires emissions 
reporting by agriculture.  N.Z. MINISTRY FOR THE ENV’T, NO. ME 1129, THE NEW ZEALAND 
EMISSIONS TRADING SCHEME EVALUATION 2016 9 tbl.2 (2016). 
 42.  Some emissions can be included indirectly; regulating the emissions of electricity 
generators and residential fuel suppliers, for example, covers virtually all household emissions. 
Partial coverage of excluded sources is also possible by allowing entities to earn offset credits for 
verified emission reductions. 
 43.  See supra Table 1. 
 44.  For a review, see Frédéric Brangar & Philippe Quirion, Climate Policy and the “Carbon 
Haven” Effect, 5 WIRES CLIMATE CHANGE 53 (2014) (“Most ex ante modeling studies conclude 
to leakage rates in the range of 5–20% (if no option to mitigate leakage is implemented), whereas 
ex post econometric studies have not revealed statistically significant evidence of leakage.”). 
 45.  WORLD BANK P’SHIP FOR MARKET READINESS, supra note 1, at 18. 
 46.  See EUROPEAN COMM’N, supra note 28, at 60 (outlining the provisions of the EU ETS 
to address leakage and listing several studies that attempt to estimate leakage for vulnerable 
sectors covered by the ETS). 
 47.  In a cap-and-trade ETS, for example, emitters must submit allowances equal to their 
actual emissions to achieve compliance. An emitter’s actual emissions during a period depend in 
part on its output which is uncertain. The cost of the allowances needed depends on the quantity 
received free and the quantities purchased at auction and at market prices with both auction and 
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Typically, these provisions include the ability to use offset credits from 
outside the cap for compliance and the sale of additional allowances at 
specified levels up to a price ceiling.48 In a few ETSs, such as Alberta 
and New Zealand, the price ceiling takes the form of a fixed price 
compliance option. Some ETSs also set a minimum price. A minimum 
price and a price ceiling together establish a “price collar”. 
Implementing a tax or ETS raises issues on how to treat industries 
whose prices are regulated, such as taxis and electric utilities. In the 
case of transportation fuels, the cost of the tax or ETS allowances 
increases the price of fuel, and the higher fuel price typically leads to a 
fare increase. Electric utilities can reduce emissions by adjusting the 
operations of generating units that use different fuels. That makes it 
difficult to calculate the actual cost of a tax or ETS to a utility.49 During 
the early phases of the EU ETS, provision of free allowances to electric 
utilities led to higher electricity prices and large profits for utilities.50 
To limit electricity price increases, California issues free allowances to 
utilities but requires that they be sold at the quarterly auctions. The 
revenue received is credited toward the cost of purchasing the 
allowances needed for compliance when the regulator calculates 
approved electricity prices. 
In practice, then, the instrument designs are more complex than 
the theoretical models with the result that it is sometimes difficult to 
decide whether an instrument is a carbon tax or an ETS.51 For example, 
RGGI has a minimum price, and at times between 2009 and 2013, the 
auction price was equal to the minimum price with some allowances 
not sold.52 During that time, the ETS was in effect a tax with the tax 
rate equal to the minimum price. Switzerland implemented a carbon 
 
market prices being uncertain. See generally id. 
 48.  Easwaran Narassimhan et al., Carbon Pricing in Practice: A Review of Existing 
Emissions Trading Systems, 18 CLIMATE POL’Y 967, 975–81 (2018). 
 49.  WILLIAM ACWORTH ET AL., INT’L CARBON ACTION P’SHIP, EMISSIONS TRADING AND 
ELECTRICITY SECTOR REGULATION 11 (2018). 
 50.  SANDER DE BRUYN ET AL., CE DELFT, CALCULATION OF ADDITIONAL PROFITS OF 
SECTORS AND FIRMS FROM THE EU ETS 8 (2016). 
 51.  See Lachapelle, supra note 33, at 68 (“[T]he main difference between the two 
instruments lies in setting the price versus quantity of emissions . . . Taxes are ‘price-based’ 
instruments, meaning that the price of carbon is fixed, and the quantity of emissions adjusts 
according to decisions made by private actors in the market . . . Conversely, emissions trading is 
‘quantity-based,’ meaning that the quantity of emissions is capped by the government.”). 
 52.  JONATHAN L. RAMSEUR, CONG. RES. SERV., THE REGIONAL GREENHOUSE GAS 
INITIATIVE: LESSONS LEARNED AND ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 10 (2017) (“Some of the offered 
allowances were not sold and were subsequently retired.”). 
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tax but allowed trading to achieve compliance.53 The trading option 
was widely used so the tax effectively served as the non-compliance 
penalty for the trading system.54 Consistent with other studies, this 
paper treats both as ETSs: 55 RGGI because the floor price prevailed 
only for a limited period, and Switzerland because the overwhelming 
compliance option was trading. 
III. EVALUATION CRITERIA 
The main aim of this paper is to assess the performance of carbon 
taxes and GHG ETSs as currently implemented. That requires 
evaluation criteria. Drawing on criteria suggested by Goldblatt56 as the 
basis for choosing between a tax and ETS for South Africa, the 
following evaluation criteria are proposed: 
Principal criteria: Environmental effectiveness (reduction of 
actual emissions); Cost-effectiveness (low marginal abatement cost). 
Secondary criteria: Economic efficiency (low price low volatility, price 
signal commitment into the future to support investment decisions, and 
harmonization of marginal costs across jurisdictions); Public finance 
(revenue raised, and potential cross-jurisdiction revenue flows); 
Administrative issues (institutional capacity, administrative costs, 
difficulty of making adjustments to rules, and minimization of 
corruption). 
 
 
 53.  ENVTL. DEF. FUND ET AL., SWITZERLAND: AN EMISSIONS TRADING CASE STUDY 7 
(2015) (“Firms covered by the levy had two choices: (1) pay the CO2 levy, or (2) voluntarily set a 
verified absolute emissions target and associated allowance allocation and participate in the Swiss 
ETS, which exempted them from the levy.”). 
 54.  Id. at 6 (“[T]he penalty for companies that failed to achieve their Swiss ETS targets was 
retroactive payment of the carbon levy (plus interest) for each ton of CO2 emitted since the 
company’s exemption.”). 
 55.  See, e.g., ICAP, supra note 26, at 52 (listing both RGGI and Switzerland as ETSs); see 
also MÉTIVIER ET AL., supra note 27, at 3 (listing both RGGI and Switzerland as ETSs); WORLD 
BANK, supra note 25, at 12 (listing RGGI as an ETS and Switzerland as having both an ETS and 
a carbon tax and demonstrating that other studies also treat them as ETSs). 
 56.  The Goldblatt criteria include the public policy criteria of economic efficiency, 
environmental effectiveness, public finance considerations, welfare impacts, administrative 
complexity, and relationship to global GHG reduction; they also include sub-criteria of price 
volatility, impact on investment, certainty of results, coverage and exemptions, ability to monitor 
and enforce, and ability to raise revenue cross-country revenue flows tax incidence and 
interactions, distribution of costs and benefits across income groups, economic sectors and 
generations, transparency of costs and benefits, institutional capacity costs of administration 
minimization of corruption, level of emissions leakage, ability to harmonize global carbon pricing 
efforts. Michael Goldblatt, Comparison of Emissions Trading and Carbon Taxation in South 
Africa, 10 CLIMATE POL’Y 511, 516 (2010). 
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A jurisdiction implementing a carbon tax or GHG ETS may also 
be concerned about, inter alia, employment, income distribution, 
regional impacts, economic growth, and technology development. 
These are important issues that can be addressed through the design of 
the instrument and use of the revenue generated. In our judgment, 
these factors are not issues inherent to a tax or ETS so we do not use 
them to assess the performance of the instruments. 
A. Environmental effectiveness 
Since the overriding purpose of a carbon tax or GHG ETS is to 
reduce GHG emissions, the primary criterion is environmental 
effectiveness.57 Environmental effectiveness has two dimensions—the 
share of the jurisdiction’s GHG emissions covered by the instrument 
and the net reduction in aggregate emissions covered by the 
instrument. 
All else equal, an instrument that covers a larger share of a 
jurisdiction’s emissions should lead to larger emission reductions and 
so be more effective. The share of the jurisdiction’s emissions covered 
varies widely for existing carbon taxes and ETSs as shown in Table 1, 
but the overall average is only slightly higher (48.1%) for ETSs than 
taxes (45.5%). 58  Any difference in environmental effectiveness 
therefore depends primarily on the reduction in the aggregate 
emissions covered by the instruments. 
Measuring emission reductions achieved by a carbon tax or ETS 
and comparing reductions across jurisdictions raise several issues. A 
tax or ETS has both price effects and revenue effects. As the cost of 
emitting GHGs rises, consumers opt to purchase less GHG-intensive 
goods and services. The revenue collected reduces income spent on 
GHG-emitting activities, which lowers emissions, but how the revenue 
is used could further raise or lower emissions. These price and revenue 
effects impact not only the jurisdiction implementing the policy, but 
also other jurisdictions with which it has direct or indirect economic 
relationships. 
 
 
 57.  Some jurisdictions may have implemented an instrument, more likely a tax than an ETS, 
as a means of raising revenue. Ireland’s carbon tax, for example, was introduced to help meet 
revenue raising and expenditure reduction targets established as conditions for international 
financial support to help the country’s address its fiscal crisis. See Frank Convery, Louise Dunne 
& Deirdre Joyce, Carbon Tax in the Context of the Fiscal Crisis, 8 CYPRUS ECON. POL’Y REV. 
135, 135–36 (2014). 
 58.  An ETS that allows the use of offset credits for compliance extends the price signal to 
sources outside the cap that are eligible to generate credits. 
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Since these instruments put a price on GHG emissions in the 
implementing jurisdiction, the price effects are the key to their 
performance. The first issue is whether to include the revenue effects 
when assessing their performance. Our choice is to exclude the revenue 
effects for conceptual and practical reasons. Conceptually, use of tax 
revenue involves distinct policy choices not necessarily related to 
emissions policy. While the proposed use of revenue may be important 
in building support for a tax or ETS when it is introduced, actual use of 
the revenue changes over time and varies widely across jurisdictions. 
The practical reason is that there are several revenue effects that 
are difficult to estimate and that have different impacts on emissions. 
Revenue collected reduces spending on GHG-emitting goods and 
services, thus lowering emissions. However, some of the revenue 
redistributed to firms and households is spent on GHG-emitting goods 
and services, thus raising emissions, whereas revenue used to fund 
mitigation measures lowers emissions.59 As a result, the effect of those 
expenditures would be double counted, both as lower emissions due to 
the instrument and as funded reductions. The fact that these changes 
in emissions are spread across multiple jurisdictions increases the 
practical difficulties of trying to estimate the revenue effects. 
Focusing on the emission reductions due to the price effects raises 
the issue of the appropriate geographic scope. Our choice is to focus 
on emission reductions in the implementing jurisdiction. Again, there 
are conceptual and practical reasons for this choice. The conceptual 
reason is that the instrument is implemented by a jurisdiction for the 
purpose of reducing its emissions; thus, that is the relevant measure of 
performance. However, the climate change impact depends on changes 
to global emissions, which may be lower than the domestic reductions 
due to inter-jurisdictional leakage. 
The practical reason for focusing on domestic emission reductions 
is that leakage is very difficult to estimate and is likely to be small in 
practice. Implementation of a carbon pricing instrument can lead to 
higher emissions by other sources via several different channels.60 Such 
 
 59.  See Jeremy Carl & David Fedor, Tracking Global Carbon Revenues: A Survey of Carbon 
Taxes Versus Cap-and-Trade in the Real World, 96 ENERGY POL’Y 50, 52–53 (2016). Revenue 
collected in 2013 totaled USD 21.7 billion for taxes and USD 6.57 billion for ETSs. Id. at 51–52. 
Redistributed shares were reported as tax cuts and rebates and were used to fund adaptation and 
emission reduction measures. Id. at 65. The shares reported for the use of tax revenue do not sum 
to 100. Id. at 52. 
 60.  See Zengkai Zhang & Zhong Xiang Zhang, Intermediate Input Linkage and Carbon 
Leakage 1, 3 n.1 (Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei, Working Paper No. 062, 2016) (identifying the 
competitiveness channel, fossil fuel channel, terms-of-trade effect, abatement resource effect, 
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inter-source leakage is difficult to estimate.61 Ex ante model estimates 
range from 5% to 20%, but the modelled instruments often lack the 
specific provisions implemented to minimize leakage. Ex post 
econometric studies for Europe find no evidence of leakage. 62 
Instrument designs try to limit the leakage by reducing the economic 
cost to EITE sources through exemptions, rebates, free allowances or 
other measures.63 
The challenge, then, is to measure the changes in domestic 
emissions due to the price effects of the tax or ETS. The instrument 
reduces emissions from what they would have been. Estimating what 
emissions would have been and then calculating the reduction achieved 
by the instrument is complex and speculative. Business-as-usual 
emissions cannot be observed, only estimated. 64  Ex post estimates 
based on actual levels of economic activity, weather, energy prices and 
other factors affecting emissions are likely to be more accurate, but 
they are still uncertain.65 
We adopt a more practical, but more stringent, measure of 
performance: the change in actual emissions subject to the instrument. 
Data on actual emissions are verified for compliance purposes and are 
reliable and publicly available for most of the ETSs. We have not found 
a single jurisdiction that regularly tracks emissions subject to its carbon 
 
technology channel, scale channel, and intertemporal channel). 
 61.  See Brangar & Quirion, supra note 44, at 58 (“A recent comparative study of 12 different 
models gave the most robust results so far. The estimate of leakage is 5-19% . . . .”); see also Bruce 
Arnold, International Trade and Carbon Leakage 2 (Cong. Budget Office, Working Paper No. 
2013-08, 2013) (stating that “[e]stimates of leakage . . . range from 1 percent to 23 percent”); 
Zhong Xiang Zhang, Competitiveness and Leakage Concerns and Border Carbon Adjustments 9 
(Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei, Working Paper No. 731, 2012) (citing “estimates of carbon 
leakages . . . in the range of 5-20%”). 
 62.  See Brangar & Quirion, supra note 44, at 60 (“The studies focusing on the EU ETS, the 
largest carbon pricing experiment so far, have not revealed any evidence of carbon leakage . . . 
.”). 
 63.  See generally Justin Caron et al., Leakage from Sub-National Climate Policy: The Case 
of California’s Cap-and-Trade Program, 36 ENERGY J. 25 (2015); see also Zhang, supra note 61, 
19–21; Elisa Lanzi et al., Addressing Competitiveness and Carbon Leakage Impacts Arising from 
Multiple Carbon Markets: A Modelling Assessment 27 (OECD Publ’g, Working Paper No. 58, 
2013); EUROPEAN COMM’N, supra note 28, at 36. 
 64.  See A. Denny Ellerman & Barbara K. Buchner, Over-Allocation or Abatement? A 
Preliminary Analysis of the EU ETS Based on the 2005–06 Emissions Data 7 (Fondazione Eni 
Enrico Mattei, Working Paper No. 139, 2006) (“Given uncertainty, the only way to overcome . . . 
over- and under-allocation would be to adjust allowances ex post . . . .”). 
 65.  Id. (“To the extent that economic activity, weather or any other factor affecting 
emissions deviates from what is expected, counterfactual emissions will be higher or lower than 
expected and any given cap will be more or less constraining with consequent effects on the 
positions of all the components.”) 
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tax. Our approach to estimating taxed emissions is discun Section IV. 
Because reduction from what emissions would have been may not be 
sufficient to lower actual emissions, requiring a reduction in actual 
emissions is a more stringent criterion. We believe reduction of actual 
emissions is an appropriate criterion given that most of the jurisdictions 
that have implemented a tax or ETS have a GHG target expressed as 
a reduction from a historic level.66 
The use of external offset credits for compliance leads to higher 
actual emissions and hence worse performance for some ETSs. This 
applies only to ETSs, since none of the taxes being assessed allows the 
use of offsets for compliance.67 Actual emissions are not adjusted for 
the use of external offset credits because they were used mainly 
between 2011 and 2014, with negligible use during earlier and later 
years.68 This means they have negligible impact on the actual emissions 
during the years used to calculate the rates of change in emissions.69 If 
there is an impact, it is to make our standard slightly more stringent. 
In summary, the environmental performance of an instrument is 
measured as the change in actual emissions by sources subject to the 
instrument. Emissions changes due to the collection and use of the 
revenue are excluded. Emissions changes due to the use of offsets and 
leakage are likewise excluded. This is a more stringent measure of 
 
 66.  For example, British Columbia has a target of a 33% reduction from 2007 emissions by 
2020, and Quebec has a target of a 20% reduction from 1990 GHG levels by 2020. See CARBON 
DISCLOSURE PROJECT (“CDP”), GLOBAL STATES AND REGIONS ANNUAL DISCLOSURE, 2017 
UPDATE 5–6 (2017). The EU target is a 14% reduction from 2005 emissions by 2020 with the ETS 
achieving a 21% reduction and non-ETS sectors a 10% reduction. See EUROPEAN COMM’N, supra 
note 28, at 12. Tokyo has a target of a 25% reduction from 2000 GHG levels by 2020, and RGGI 
states have a regional target of a more than 50% reduction of CO2 emissions from electricity 
generation from 2005 levels by 2020. See Japan Tokyo Cap-and Trade Program and USA – 
Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) Factsheets, ICAP, https://icapcarbonaction.com/ 
en/ets-map?etsid=50. The reduction target for the tax or ETS may differ from the overall target 
for the jurisdiction but since these instruments cover about half of the jurisdiction’s total emissions 
on average, an overall target that requires a reduction in actual emissions likely requires a 
reduction in emissions subject to the instrument as well. 
 67.  But see CLIMATE ACTION RESERVE, INTRODUCTION TO CARBON MARKETS IN 
MEXICO 3 (2015). The Mexican carbon tax legislation allows entities to use CERs generated by 
CDM projects in Mexico to reduce their overall tax bill by an amount equivalent to the market 
value of the CERs at the time the tax is paid. Id. It appears that these rules and valuation criteria 
have yet to be fully developed. Id. 
 68.  Haites, supra note 37, at 252–54. 
 69.  See RANDALL SPALDING-FECHER ET AL., CDM POLICY DIALOGUE, ASSESSING THE 
IMPACT OF THE CLEAN DEVELOPMENT MECHANISM  37 (2012) (concluding that “[t]he CDM [an 
offset credit] in its current form has negligible sustainable development benefits”); see also Peter 
Erickson et al., Net Climate Change Mitigation of the Clean Development Mechanism, 72 ENERGY 
POL’Y 147 (2014) (stating that an assessment of the performance of the instruments on a global 
basis would need to address the additionality of the offset credits). 
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performance than a reduction from what emissions would have been, 
but it is consistent with the targets of most of the jurisdictions that 
implemented the instruments and relies upon on much higher quality 
data. 
The performance of instruments that cover different quantities of 
emissions and that have been in effect for different periods of time is 
compared on the basis of the compound annual rate of change of actual 
emissions. The use of the annual rate of change also enables 
instruments whose data are reported for fiscal years to be compared 
with those that report on a calendar year basis. The use of data on 
actual emissions means that the base for calculating the annual rate of 
change is the actual emissions for the first year or first compliance 
period the instrument was in effect and, consequently, that any 
reductions achieved during the first year or period are excluded.70 
Again, this yields a conservative estimate of performance. 
B. Cost effectiveness 
Cost effectiveness focuses on achieving the emission reduction 
target at minimum cost. Minimizing the cost of reducing GHG 
emissions benefits society by freeing up resources for other priorities. 
Indeed, the main motivation for implementing carbon taxes and GHG 
ETSs is that they can reduce emissions at lower cost to society than 
other forms of regulation.71 
The marginal abatement cost for an emitter is the tax rate (USD 
/tCO2e), in the case of a carbon tax, and the price of an allowance, in 
the case of an ETS.72 The tax rate is set by the government, while the 
allowance price is determined by the market. Jurisdictions set the tax 
rate to achieve an emissions reduction target, meet a revenue target, 
reflect the social cost of CO2 emissions, or match compliance costs in 
other jurisdictions.73 The allowance price reflects the emissions target 
and other provisions of the ETS design. 
In practice, both tax rates and allowance prices span wide ranges. 
As shown in Table 1, tax rates range from less than USD 1/tCO2e to 
USD 140/tCO2e, while ETS prices range from less than USD 1/tCO2e 
 
 70.  The Japanese carbon tax and Irish solid fuel carbon tax took effect mid-year. The actual 
emissions for the first full year are used as the base of the calculation of rate of emission reduction. 
 71.  Pollitt, supra note 1, at 3; Baranzini et al., supra note 2, at 3–6. 
 72.  Pollitt, supra note 1, at 7–8. 
 73.  WORLD BANK P’SHIP FOR MARKET READINESS, supra note 1, at 26 (“Carbon taxes can 
also be designed to generate a number of . . . important benefits, such as raising revenue, 
internalizing the social costs of emissions, and increasing the efficiency of the tax system.”). 
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to USD 24/tCO2e. In 2017 the average tax rate (USD 13.04) was over 
65% higher than the average ETS allowance price (USD 7.79).  
Some analyses compare tax rates and allowance prices to 
estimates of the economic value of a one tCO2e emission reduction (the 
social cost of carbon) over time.74 This cost-benefit test is difficult to 
implement due to the wide range of the estimated values of the social 
cost of carbon.75 In addition, using the social cost of carbon may be 
inappropriate because it incorporates numerous impacts of GHG 
emissions that are very difficult to estimate and applies a marginal 
value to a non-marginal situation, the need to completely eliminate 
anthropogenic GHG emissions to stabilize atmospheric 
concentrations.76 
Since most of the jurisdictions that have implemented a carbon tax 
or GHG ETS have a target that requires a reduction of actual 
emissions, the cost-effectiveness goal of achieving that target at the 
lowest cost is more appropriate than the cost-benefit test that compares 
the tax rate or allowance price with the social cost of carbon. Even if a 
specific value of the social cost of carbon could be agreed upon, the 
emission reduction that would be achieved with a tax rate or allowance 
price equal to that value is not known for most jurisdictions and is 
unlikely to coincide with its established target. 
C. Economic efficiency 
Economic efficiency has several dimensions in addition to cost 
effectiveness, including price stability, a credible price signal, and 
harmonization across jurisdictions.77 The vast majority of mitigation 
 
 74.  See Lawrence H. Goulder et al., China’s National Carbon Dioxide Emission Trading 
System: An Introduction, 6 ECON. ENERGY & ENVTL. POL’Y 1, 11–12 (2017) (“The social cost of 
carbon (SCC) represents the marginal climate benefit, and in a well-functioning ETS the 
allowance price indicates marginal abatement costs.”). 
 75.  See, e.g., William D. Nordhaus, Revisiting the Social Cost of Carbon, 114 PROCEEDINGS 
NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 1518, 1520–21 (2017); NICHOLAS STERN, THE ECONOMICS OF CLIMATE 
CHANGE: THE STERN REVIEW 62 (2006); Stephen Smith & Nils Axel Braathen, Monetary Carbon 
Values in Policy Appraisal: An Overview of Current Practice and Key Issues 10–15 (OECD Publ’g, 
Working Paper No. 92, 2015) (discussing how estimating the social cost of carbon is very complex 
and the results are very sensitive to the discount rate used, with several authors discussing 
methodological issues and values used by different countries); Maximilian Auffhammer, 
Quantifying Economic Damages from Climate Change, 32 J. ECON. PERSPS. 33 (2018) (describing 
the multiple approaches to estimating the social cost of carbon). 
 76.  See Morgan et al., Rethinking the Social Cost of Carbon Dioxide, 33 ISSUES IN SCI. & 
TECH. 4 (2017) (asserting that “false precision from IAMs is being used in the generation of 
quantitative ‘answers’ that have come to serve as an inappropriate foundation for public 
policies”). 
 77.  See WORLD BANK CARBON PRICING LEADERSHIP COAL., REPORT OF THE HIGH-
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actions involve capital investments; price stability and a credible price 
signal facilitate those investment decisions. Harmonization across 
jurisdictions improves global economic efficiency. An ETS is 
countercyclical—during a recession output declines, emissions fall, 
allowance prices drop, and compliance costs are reduced with the 
opposite effects during an economic boom—while the tax rate remains 
constant or rises.78 
Price stability (low volatility) allows market participants to better 
evaluate potential mitigation options. 79  A tax is more stable than 
allowance prices, but changes to the tax rate tend to be unpredictable.80 
Many ETSs include provisions to enhance price stability such as sale of 
additional allowances when the price is high, access to offset credits, 
and a minimum price. Larger ETSs tend to have options and futures 
contracts that enable sources to obtain allowances at an agreed price 
at a future date, thus reducing price uncertainty.81 Comparable options 
and contracts do not exist for taxes. 
A commitment that signals future prices also facilitates mitigation 
investment decisions.82 The price signal should cover a period during 
which most investments are repaid—at least five years into the future. 
When a new carbon tax is implemented, annual or biannual tax rate 
increases are often announced three to five years into the future.83 The 
frequency of tax rate changes varies widely across jurisdictions, but 
across all the taxes analyzed, about 40% of the years have no increase 
 
LEVEL COMMISSION ON CARBON PRICES 21–24 (2017) (discussing characteristics of “dynamic 
and adaptive climate policy designs,” including the efficiency of carbon-price signals and 
international cooperation). 
 78.  See Pollitt, supra note 1, at 11 (contrasting carbon trading schemes with “[f]ixed tax rates 
[which] become more burdensome and hence difficult to defend in times of recession”). 
 79.  If future allowance or credit prices are uncertain, the value of future emission reductions 
is uncertain. Greater price volatility means greater uncertainty. Greater uncertainty favors 
investments with shorter payback periods. 
 80.  See infra Section IV.C. For a discussion of the possible mechanisms to reduce the 
political uncertainty associated with taxes, see WORLD BANK P’SHIP FOR MARKET READINESS, 
supra note 1, at chs.6, 7. 
 81.  See EUROPEAN COMM’N, supra note 28, at 71 (describing futures and options trades). 
The ICE exchange, for example, offers Futures Options for the allowances of the EU ETS 
(EUAs). See EUA Futures Options Contract, INTERCONTINENTAL EXCHANGE, 
https://www.theice.com/products/196/EUA-Futures-Options (last visited Oct. 25, 2018). 
 82.  See Dijkgraaf et al., On the Effectiveness of Feed-In Tariffs in the Development of Solar 
Photovoltaics, 39 ENERGY J. 81, 94 (2018) (finding in their analysis of the effectiveness of feed-in-
tariffs for solar photovoltaics in Europe that the maximum effect can be as much as seven times 
larger with a high tariff and a long contract duration in combination with a consistent policy). 
 83.  See generally WORLD BANK P’SHIP FOR MARKET READINESS, supra note 1, at apps. 
(showing that upon introduction, tax rates were specified for three years by France and the UK 
and for five years by British Columbia and Japan). 
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in the tax rate.84 Practices relating to changes in tax rates are discussed 
further in Section IV.C. ETSs tend to have longer (five to eight years) 
and stronger commitments (regulations and legislation) to future caps 
and price stability provisions.85 
Global economic efficiency is improved if all sources in all 
jurisdictions face the same marginal abatement cost. In principle, 
carbon taxes can be harmonized across jurisdictions, but international 
coordination of a tax is very complex and has never been attempted.86 
Linking ETSs to allow participants to use allowances from any of the 
linked ETS for compliance could narrow allowance price differences. 
Such linking is common, but current ETSs limit the quantity of 
imported allowances. Thus, the price differences across ETSs are 
narrowed but not eliminated and the potential savings are only 
partially realized.87 
D. Public finance 
Both taxes and ETSs (auctioned allowances) raise revenue. The 
revenue can be used for a mix of economic stimulus (reduce existing 
distortionary taxes), equity (fair distribution of the costs of reducing 
GHG emissions), environmental goals (funding GHG reductions or 
adaptation measures), and other purposes. Although we exclude the 
emissions impacts of revenue collection and use, the amount of 
revenue collected and its use for economic and environmental 
purposes can be an important consideration in building and sustaining 
support for a carbon tax or GHG ETS. 
Carbon taxes tend to raise more revenue than ETSs for two 
reasons. A carbon tax imposes the tax on all designated emissions, 
while many ETSs distribute some allowances for free. Furthermore, tax 
 
 84.  Analysis of the tax rate data in infra Annex I shows that in 42% of the years the tax rate 
was the same as the previous year. 
 85.   See generally Jessika Luth Richter & Lizzie Chambers, Reflections and Outlook for the 
New Zealand ETS, 10 POL’Y Q. 57 (2014) (concluding that regulatory uncertainty meant there 
was no incentive to invest in mitigation actions thus contributing to the ineffectiveness of the New 
Zealand ETS). 
 86.  It is the effective tax that must be harmonized. In addition to the carbon tax, the effective 
tax also depends on other taxes such as fuel taxes, Value Added Tax (VAT), and sales taxes on 
energy, so the burden of all of those taxes on each category of emitters needs to be harmonized. 
Then there are practical issues of harmonizing taxes denominated in different currencies and 
coordinating implementation of tax changes across jurisdictions. See Pollitt, supra note 1, at 10. 
 87.  RGGI consists of nine linked state systems but they use a common allowance, so there 
are no restrictions on transfers among states. Similarly, California and Quebec use allowances 
that are indistinguishable to users with no restrictions on interjurisdictional transfers. Haites, 
supra note 37, at 257. 
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rates tend to be higher than allowance prices, thereby raising more 
revenue. In 2013, carbon taxes collected USD 21.7 billion in revenue 
while ETSs generated USD 6.57 billion.88 By 2017, the total revenue 
had increased to USD 32 billion: USD 21 billion from taxes and USD 
11 billion by ETSs.89 
In practice, the revenue collected from carbon taxes and ETSs is 
used differently. In 2013, 70% of the ETS revenue was used to 
subsidize “green” spending on energy efficiency, renewable energy, 
and adaptation measures; 21% went to general revenue; and 9% was 
used to fund corporate and individual tax cuts or direct rebates.90 In the 
case of carbon taxes, 15% of the revenue was used to support green 
spending, 28% went to general revenue and 44% was used for tax cuts 
and rebates.91 These percentages vary widely across jurisdictions for 
both taxes and ETSs. 
A considerable body of literature is devoted to the potential 
economic benefits of revenue recycling—using carbon tax or ETS 
auction revenue to reduce existing distortionary taxes.92 Based on the 
2013 data, as much as 85% of the tax revenue and up to 30% of the 
ETS revenue might be used to reduce existing distortionary taxes. 
These figures combine the percentages of revenue that went to general 
revenue (and so could offset revenue lost due to cuts in other taxes) 
and to tax cuts and rebates. 
Many of the national jurisdictions that have implemented a carbon 
tax and a GHG ETS were parties to the Kyoto Protocol for the 2008–
12 commitment period,93 including the members of the EU ETS, Japan, 
 
 88.  Carl & Fedor, supra note 59, at 52–53. 
 89.  CLÉMENT MÉTIVIER ET AL., INST. FOR CLIMATE ECON., Global Carbon Account 2018 
1, 4 (2018), https://www.i4ce.org/publications-2/; see also Smith & Braathen, supra note 75, at 10–
16. 
 90.  Carl & Fedor, supra note 59, at 52–53. 
 91.  Id. at 53. Rebates are more likely to go to entities subject to the tax, such as EITE firms, 
while tax cuts are more likely to go to individuals adversely affected by the carbon tax. The 
percentages for the use of carbon tax revenue do not sum to 100. If the shares are recalculated to 
sum to 100, they are 17% green spending, 32% general revenue, and 51% tax cuts and rebates. 
 92.  See Cameron Hepburn, Regulation by Prices, Quantities or Both: A Review of Instrument 
Choice, 22 OXFORD REV. ECON. POL’Y 226, 236–37 (2006) (reviewing the literature on the 
economic benefits of revenue recycling). 
 93.  The Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 
which entered into force in 2005, committed parties listed in Annex B (developed countries and 
countries with economies in transition) to limit their 2008–12 greenhouse gas emissions. It 
established three international emissions trading mechanisms that the parties could use to help 
them meet their commitments—the clean development mechanism (CDM, article 12), joint 
implementation (JI, article 6), and international emissions trading (IET, article 17). The CDM 
enabled approved emission projects in developing countries to earn credits (CERs) that could be 
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New Zealand, and Switzerland. The Kyoto Protocol established three 
international market mechanisms—the clean development 
mechanism, joint implementation, and international emissions trading. 
The units traded using these mechanisms—CERs, ERUs, and AAUs 
respectively—were accepted, with some qualitative and quantitative 
restrictions, for compliance by the national ETSs of these countries.94 
CER purchases by ETS participants helped fund emission reduction 
measures in developing countries.95 
All international climate agreements have called, and continue to 
call, for resource transfers from developed to developing countries.96 
With an ETS such transfers can occur via trade in allowances and offset 
credits as well as through government budgets. With a carbon tax 
international resource transfers must flow through government 
budgets. 
E. Administrative issues 
An ETS requires a more complex and costlier administrative 
structure than a carbon tax. Although most jurisdictions already collect 
taxes on fossil fuels, adding a carbon tax may involve changes to the 
monitoring, reporting, and verification (MRV) system and to 
compliance enforcement. The administrative complexity and cost rise 
if the scope of the carbon tax extends beyond fossil fuels already taxed.  
An ETS, on the other hand, creates new administrative 
requirements including: an MRV system; institutions to distribute 
allowances, enforce compliance, and monitor the allowance market; 
and a computer registry to track allowance holdings. Jurisdictions that 
have implemented an ETS, such as the EU and California, have offered 
 
sold to Annex B parties. JI and IET enabled credits (ERUs) and allowances (AAUs) respectively 
to be traded among Annex B parties. In 2012, the Doha amendment to the Kyoto Protocol that 
specifies 2013–20 commitments for Annex B parties was adopted. The Amendment has not yet 
entered into force. See Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change, Dec. 10, 1997, U.N. Doc FCCC/CP/1997/7/Add.1, 37 I.L.M. 22 (1998); What is the Kyoto 
Protocol?, UN FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE, https://unfccc.int/process-
and-meetings/the-kyoto-protocol/what-is-the-kyoto-protocol (last visited Nov. 3, 2018). 
 94.  Haites, supra note 37, at 251–55. 
 95.  See CDM Pipeline Overview, UNEP DTU PARTNERSHIP, www.cdmpipeline.org (last 
visited Oct. 4, 2018) (showing that the clean development mechanism, the largest of the three 
trading mechanisms, involved over 7,500 in projects in more than 95 developing countries).  
 96.  United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (“UNFCCC”) arts. 4.3, 4.4. 
and 11, 31 I.L.M. 849, May 9, 1991; Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention 
on Climate Change art. 11, Conference of the Parties, 3d Sess., Dec. 10, 1997, UN Doc 
FCCC/CP.1997/L.7/Add.1, 37 I.L.M. 22; Paris Agreement to the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change art. 9, Apr. 22, 2016. 
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support relating to instrument design and development of institutional 
capacity to other jurisdictions. 
Implementation of a carbon tax or ETS usually requires specific 
legislation and regulations. Once implemented, changes to the tax rate 
or coverage often can be made as part of a budget. Changes to the rules 
governing an ETS tend to require changes to regulations and 
legislation, which usually involves a process of notice and consultation. 
In the case of multi-jurisdiction ETSs, such as the EU ETS and RGGI, 
changes can take several years to implement. No attempt has yet been 
made to implement a carbon tax that is harmonized across multiple 
jurisdictions. 
We are not aware of data on the cost of implementing and 
administering an ETS or a carbon tax.97 The administrative costs of 
environmental taxes, rather than carbon taxes specifically, are reported 
to be low. 98  Data on tax avoidance for carbon taxes and various 
possible forms of corruption for ETSs also are very scarce. Sweden 
reports a carbon tax evasion rate of 1% and the UK estimates an 
energy tax evasion rate of about 2%.99 
IV. REDUCTIONS IN EMISSIONS SUBJECT TO CARBON TAXES 
This section assesses the GHG emissions changes in jurisdictions 
that have implemented carbon taxes, reviews other assessments of the 
performance of the British Columbia and early European carbon taxes, 
compares changes in non-ETS and taxed emissions for European 
carbon taxes since 2008, and reviews factors that limit the performance 
of carbon taxes. 
A. Changes in emissions subject to carbon taxes 
To assess the impact of a carbon tax on the emissions by sources 
subject to the tax, we need data on taxed emissions. We did not find a 
single jurisdiction that regularly reports the emissions subject to any of 
its carbon taxes.100 The absence of such data probably reflects the fact 
 
 97.  See JONATHAN L. RAMSEUR, THE REGIONAL GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE: 
LESSONS LEARNED AND ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 12 (Cong. Res. Serv. 2017) (reporting that that 
5% of RGGI’s auction revenue is used for administration and RGGI Inc. which manages the 
system). 
 98.  See EUROPEAN ENV’T AGENCY, ENVIRONMENTAL TAXATION AND EU 
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES 16 (2016), https://www.eea.europa.eu/publications/environmental-
taxation-and-eu-environmental-policies (reporting administrative costs for German and UK 
environmental taxes at less than 0.5%). 
 99.  See id. (showing that both rates are much lower than the evasion rates for other taxes). 
 100.  See infra Annex I (Denmark, Ireland and Slovenia have two carbon taxes while Norway 
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that governments are interested primarily in collecting the taxes due 
and therefore do not require the taxpayers to report the associated 
CO2e emissions. Governments could, of course, easily calculate the 
CO2e emissions from the data provided. 
We estimate the emissions covered by a carbon tax by dividing the 
carbon tax revenue collected by the tax rate per tCO2e. That requires 
data on the carbon tax revenue collected and the tax rate which, 
fortunately, are available for many jurisdictions. We were not able to 
collect the requisite data for Estonia, Finland, Latvia, Mexico, Poland, 
or Portugal. We were not able to collect the required data for a few 
years after implementation of the carbon taxes in Denmark, Norway, 
Slovenia, and Sweden either. The data on tax revenue, tax rate, and 
estimated taxed emissions by jurisdiction and tax are presented in 
Annex 1. 
As discussed in section III.A, this calculation estimates actual 
emissions subject to the carbon tax with no adjustments for leakage or 
emission changes due to use of the tax revenue. Ireland has different 
carbon taxes for two groups of fossil fuels. Denmark and Slovenia each 
have two carbon taxes—on specified CO2 emissions and on sales of 
fluorinated gases—while Norway also taxes emissions by offshore oil 
and gas activities for a total of three. Since some carbon taxes apply 
discounted tax rates to emissions by specified sources, the calculation 
tends to understate the emissions subject to the carbon tax somewhat. 
However, focusing on the annual rates of change and using the 
estimated emissions during the first year as the base minimizes the 
effect of such underestimation. 
We ignore small changes in the coverage of the tax. For example, 
British Columbia offered a one-time exemption (worth CAD 7.6 
million) from the carbon tax for greenhouse operators in 2012.101 The 
2013 budget changed this to an ongoing 80% reduction of the tax for 
greenhouse operators.102 Gasoline and diesel used for agriculture were 
exempted from the carbon tax by the 2014 budget.103 For different 
 
has three). 
 101.  At the tax rate of CAD 30/tCO2, the exemption represented about 0.25 MtCO2, about 
0.67% of the emissions covered by the tax. Information on the magnitude of the agricultural fuel 
exemption is not available, but the changes in the annual emissions suggest that it is small as well. 
See Brian Murray & Nicholas Rivers, British Columbia’s Revenue-Neutral Carbon Tax: A Review 
of the Latest “Grand Experiment” 4–5 (Nicholas Inst., Working Paper No. 15–04, 2015), 
http://nicholasinstitute.duke.edu/publications (listing exemptions). 
 102.  B.C. MINISTRY OF FINANCE, BUDGET AND FISCAL PLAN, 2013/14–2015/16 60 (2013), 
https://www.bcbudget.gov.bc.ca/2013/bfp/2013_Budget_Fiscal_Plan.pdf. 
 103.  NICHOLAS RIVERS & BRANDON SCHAUFELE, PAC. INST. CLIMATE SOLS., THE EFFECT 
3. Haites Final Word Doc Original Spacing (Do Not Delete) 1/4/2019  4:34 PM 
Fall 2018] CARBON TAXES & EMISSIONS TRADING SYSTEMS 135 
jurisdictions, the data relate to calendar or fiscal years. Comparisons of 
annual rates of change are valid across jurisdictions with different fiscal 
years. 
We were able to estimate taxed emissions for 17 carbon taxes in 
12 jurisdictions. Table 2 compares our estimates of the 2016 taxed 
emissions by all of a jurisdiction’s carbon taxes as a share of its total 
GHG emissions, excluding land use, land use change, and forestry 
(LULUCF) emissions, with those from Métivier et al. reported in 
Table 1. Since Métivier et al. was published early in 2017, the shares it 
reports probably relate to 2015 or 2016, but the data and the 
methodology used to calculate the shares reported are not specified. 
Thus, it is not possible to explain the reasons for differences between 
our estimated shares and those reported by Métivier et al. 
Table 2. Taxed Emissions as a Share of Total GHG Emissions 
 
Jurisdiction 
Estimates 
from Table 
1 
Estimates from tax 
revenue and tax rate for 
2016 
Norway 60% 58% 
Sweden 42% 40% 
Denmark 45% 44% 
Slovenia 24% 44% 
British 
Columbia 
70% 68% 
Liechtenstein 26% 28% 
Switzerland 35% 26% 
Ireland 33% 30% 
Iceland 55% 62% 
Japan 70% 65% 
UK 25% 12% 
France 40% 39% 
Sources: Table 1 and estimates of taxed emissions from 
Annex 1 divided by total GHG emissions excluding 
LULUCF.  
 
 
 
OF BRITISH COLUMBIA’S CARBON TAX ON AGRICULTURAL TRADE 6 (2014) (stating that 
farmers were exempted from the carbon tax on the purchase of colored gasoline and colored 
diesel fuel for farm use effective January 1, 2014). 
3. Haites Final Word Doc Original Spacing (Do Not Delete) 1/4/2019  4:34 PM 
136 DUKE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY FORUM [Vol. XXIX:109 
The two estimates are surprisingly close except for Iceland, 
Slovenia, Switzerland, and the UK. In the case of the UK, the reason 
may be the rapid decline in emissions by coal-fired generating units 
subject to the carbon price floor: using our 2015 data yields a share of 
23% rather than 12%. Our estimates of taxed emissions also yield 
reasonable shares of total GHG emissions and of non-ETS emissions, 
where applicable, over time. In short, we feel our estimates of taxed 
emissions are reasonable and suitable for assessing the performance of 
the carbon taxes. 
The annual rate of change of taxed emissions for each of the 17 
carbon taxes for which we have data is shown in Table 3. Only six of 
the 17 taxes have reduced actual emissions—Denmark (duty on CO2), 
Japan, Slovenia (fluorinated gases), Sweden, Switzerland and the UK. 
The rates of change of taxed emissions vary widely, from a reduction 
of over 42% per year for the UK carbon price floor to an increase of 
more than 24% per year for fluorinated gases in Denmark. 
Table 3. Annual Rate of Change of Taxed Emissions by Carbon 
Tax 
Jurisdiction/tax 
Time 
period 
Annual rate of 
change of taxed 
emissions (%) 
Norway   
 Tax on CO2 emissions 
1994–
2016 2.10 
 Tax on offshore CO2 
emissions 
1999–
2016 
5.22 
 Tax on fluorinated gases 2003–
2016 
3.46 
Sweden 
1993–
2016 -1.91 
Denmark   
 Duty on CO2 emissions 
1994–
2016 -2.31 
Tax on fluorinated gases 2013–
2016 
24.08 
Slovenia   
 Tax on CO2 emissions 1999–2016 1.24 
 Tax on fluorinated gases 2010–2016 -11.23 
3. Haites Final Word Doc Original Spacing (Do Not Delete) 1/4/2019  4:34 PM 
Fall 2018] CARBON TAXES & EMISSIONS TRADING SYSTEMS 137 
Jurisdiction/tax Time 
period 
Annual rate of 
change of taxed 
emissions (%) 
British Columbia 
2008–
2016 
3.62 
Switzerland 
2008–
2016 -4.50 
Liechtenstein 
2009–
2016 2.12 
Ireland   
 Natural gas and liquids 
carbon tax 
2011–
2016 1.41 
 Solid fuel carbon tax 2015–
2016 
14.93 
Iceland 
2011–
2015 2.91 
Japan 
2013–
2016 -3.29 
UK 
2014–
2016 -42.54 
France 
2015–
2016 
5.45 
Source: Calculated from emissions data in Annex 1 
 
An increase in emissions after implementation of the carbon tax 
does not mean the tax had no impact; only that the tax was not 
sufficient to reverse a trend of rising emissions. The studies reviewed 
in the next section assess taxes in terms of their impact on business-as-
usual emissions. As noted earlier, we believe our criterion of a 
reduction in actual emissions is more appropriate given the GHG 
targets of the jurisdictions that have implemented the taxes. 
B. Other assessments of the performance of carbon taxes 
This section summarizes other studies that have assessed the 
performance of carbon taxes. Those studies fall into two groups: 
estimates of the impact of British Columbia’s carbon tax and 
assessments of the carbon taxes implemented by European countries 
prior to 2008. 
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1. Estimates of the impact of British Columbia’s carbon tax 
British Columbia’s carbon tax went into effect on July 1, 2008 at 
CAD 10/tCO2. The tax increased at a rate of CAD 5/tCO2 per year to 
CAD 30/tCO2 per year on July 1, 2012.104 The tax rate remained at 
CAD 30/tCO2 for the next five years.105 Six published estimates of the 
impact of the tax are summarized in Table 4. All are limited to the 
period when the tax rate was rising annually. Four of the estimates 
focus on per capita or per household gasoline consumption, which 
accounts for about a quarter of the taxed emissions. The results 
reported suggest that the tax reduced emissions by 5% to 15% from 
what they would have been.106 
In Table 4 the published estimates are adjusted, where 
appropriate, for population growth and then expressed as an annual 
change in total emissions. With one exception, the estimated impacts 
are equivalent to an annual reduction of business-as-usual emissions of 
less than 2%, so actual emissions could increase despite the impact of 
the tax. 
Although it is not evident from the data in Table 4, Erutku and 
Hildebrand find that the impact began to diminish after the tax rate 
was frozen.107 Lawley and Thiverge find that the urban households 
reduced gasoline consumption more than rural households because 
they have more transportation options.108 Both results are consistent 
with the expected responses to a carbon tax. 
In summary, all studies have found that the carbon tax reduced 
the emissions an analyzed relative to business-as-usual while the tax 
rate was rising. Our data indicate that taxed emissions increased both 
during the initial five years as the tax rate rose and during the 
subsequent five years when the tax rate remained constant. These 
results are not inconsistent. Rather, they indicate that our criterion, as 
stated earlier, is more stringent. 
 
 104.  Eduardo Porter, Does a Carbon Tax Work? Ask British Columbia, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 5, 
2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/02/business/does-a-carbon-tax-work-ask-british-
columbia.html. 
 105.  Id. 
 106.  See generally Murray & Rivers, supra note 101 (drawing this conclusion based on a range 
of different studies). 
 107.  See Can Erutku & Vincent Hildebrand, Carbon Tax at the Pump in British Columbia 
and Quebec, 44 CAN. PUB. POL’Y 126, 131 (2018) (“[G]asoline consumption per capita in British 
Columbia started to increase after April 2012 (it had been on a declining trend since 2004) as the 
carbon tax peaked on and remained constant after July 2012[.]”). 
 108.  Chad Lawley & Vincent Thivierge, Refining the Evidence: British Columbia’s Carbon 
Tax and Household Gasoline Consumption, 39 ENERGY J. 147, 168 (2018). 
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Table 4. Estimates of the Impact of British Columbia’s Carbon 
Tax on Taxed Emissions 
Study Methodology Years 
Change in 
per capita 
Emissions 
Change in 
Total 
Emissions 
(TE) 
Change 
in TE per 
Year 
Elgie 
and 
McClay
109 
 
Trend in per 
capita 
consumption 
of taxed fuels 
relative to the 
rest of Canada 
from 2007–
2008 to 2011–
2012  
4 -18.8% -13.65% -3.41% 
Trend in per 
capita GHG 
emissions 
subject to the 
tax relative to 
the rest of 
Canada from 
2008 to 2011  
3 -8.9% -5.28% -1.76% 
Beck et 
al.110 
Simulation 
using static 
computable 
general EQ 
model of the 
Canadian 
economy 
calibrated to 
provincial 
production and 
consumption 
patterns.  
5  -9.14% -1.83% 
 
 109.  Stewart Elgie & Jessica McClay, BC’s Carbon Tax Shift Is Working Well After Four 
Years (Attention Ottawa), 39 CAN. PUB. POL’Y 1, 1–6 (2013). 
 110.  Marisa Beck et al., Carbon Tax and Revenue Recycling: Impacts on Households in British 
Columbia, 41 RESOURCE & ENERGY ECON. 40, 54 (2015). 
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Study Methodology Years 
Change in 
per capita 
Emissions 
Change in 
Total 
Emissions 
(TE) 
Change 
in TE per 
Year 
Rivers 
and 
Schauf
ele111 
Difference-in-
difference 
estimate of per 
capita gasoline 
use in British 
Columbia 
relative to rest 
of Canada 
from 1990 
through 2011 
4 -8.40% -3.70% -0.93% 
Lawley 
and 
Thivi-
erge112 
Difference-in-
difference 
estimate of 
household 
gasoline 
spending in 
British 
Columbia 
relative to rest 
of Canada for 
2001–2012 
5 -6.67% to 
-10.67% 
-1.13% to 
-4.87% 
<-0.97% 
Erutku 
and 
Hilde-
brand
113  
Difference-in-
difference 
estimate of per 
capita gasoline 
use in British 
Columbia 
relative to rest 
of Canada 
from 1991 
through 2015 
5 
-5.8% to -
16.4% 
-0.26% to 
-10.3% ≤-2.0% 
 
 111.  Nicholas Rivers & Brandon Schaufele, Salience of Carbon Taxes in the Gasoline Market, 
74 J. ENVTL. ECON. MGMT. 23–36 (2015). 
 112.  See Lawley & Thivierge, supra note 108, at 168 (applying the carbon tax of 6.67 c/liter to 
the lower bound estimate of tax semi-elasticity of -0.010 and the baseline estimate of -0.016 yields 
per capita emission reduction estimates of -6.67% and -10.67% respectively over 5 years). 
 113.  See generally Erutku & Hildebrand, supra note 107, at 128. 
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Note that in Table 4, impact on total emissions is calculated as the 
change in emissions divided by the population growth over the period. 
For example, the -18.8% change in emissions is partially offset by 
4.53% population growth, so the impact on total emissions is calculated 
as 1.188/1.0453 = 1.1365 or a 13.65% reduction in total emissions. 
2. Estimates of the impact of European carbon taxes prior to 
2008 
European countries that implemented carbon taxes prior to 2008 
include Denmark; Estonia; Finland; Norway; Poland; Slovenia; 
Sweden and, for limited periods, Italy and the Netherlands. Some 
analysts treat the UK’s Fossil Fuel Levy and Climate Change Levy, 
which were implemented during this period, as carbon taxes, though 
the tax rates were not related to the GHG emissions produced by the 
fuels. We found estimates of the emissions reductions achieved by the 
taxes in Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden as well as multi-
countries that also cover Austria, Germany, Italy, Netherlands and the 
UK. The findings of those studies are summarized in Table 5. Some of 
the national studies estimate reductions only for part of the emissions 
covered by the tax, such as transport or industrial emissions. 
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 Table 5. Estimates of the Impact of European Carbon Taxes on 
Taxed Emissions 
Carbon Tax  
Jurisdiction 
Time  
Period 
Emission Reductions Reduction 
per Year 
Denmark 
Bjørner and 
Jensen, 
2002114 
1992–
1997 
Energy taxes reduced 1997 BAU 
energy use by industry by 10% 
based on comparison of firms 
that paid full and reduced tax 
rates.  
 
2% 
Denmark 
Andersen, 
et al, 2000115 
1990–
1996 
Danish CO2 emissions adjusted 
for weather and electricity 
exports fell by some 4%. 
<1% 
1990–
1998 
Danish CO2 emissions adjusted 
for weather and electricity 
exports fell by some 8%. 
1% 
Finland 
Economic 
Council, 
2000116 
1990–
1998 
With no change to the 1990 
energy taxes, Finnish CO2 
emissions would have been 7% 
higher in 1998.  
 
<1% 
Norway 
Larsen and 
Nesbakken 
1997117 
1991–
1993 
CO2 emissions due to oil 
combustion for stationary use by 
households and industry and 
household transport declined by 
3-4%.  
 
<2% 
 
 
 114.  Thomas Bue Bjørner & Henrik Holm Jensen, Energy Taxes, Voluntary Agreements and 
Investment Subsidies—A Micro-Panel Analysis of the Effect on Danish Industrial Companies’ 
Energy Demand, 24 RESOURCE ENERGY ECON. 229, 243 (2002). 
 115.  Mikael Skou Andersen et al., An Evaluation of the Impact of Green Taxes in the Nordic 
Countries, TemaNord 2000:561, 13. 
 116.  Prime Minister’s Economic Council, Environmental and Energy Taxation in Finland—
Preparing for the Kyoto Challenge: Summary of the Working Group Report, Prime Minister’s 
Office Publ’n Series 4/2000, 41–42. 
 117.  Bodil Merethe Larsen & Runa Nesbakken, Norwegian Emissions of CO2 1987–1994, 9 
ENVTL. RESOURCE ECON. (1997) 287, § 5, 14. The emissions analyzed accounted for between 
35% and 41% of taxable emissions during the period.  
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Carbon Tax 
Jurisdiction 
Time 
Period Emission Reductions 
Reduction 
per Year 
Norway 
Bruvoll and 
Larsen, 
2004118 
1990–
1999 
An applied general equilibrium 
simulation of the effects of 
carbon taxes finds that they 
reduced CO2 emissions by 
2.3% over the period. 
 
<1% 
Sweden 
Andersen et 
al., 2000119 
1991–
1994 
Model estimate finds 1994 CO2 
emissions 3-5% lower than 
with continuation of 1990 
taxes. 
About 1% 
Sweden 
Bohlin, 
1998120 
1991–
1995 
Overall reduction in CO2 
emissions of 1.5 to 4.5% per 
year due to the tax. 
1.5 to 
4.5% 
Sweden  
Andersson, 
2017121 
1990–
2005 
The tax resulted a 6.3% 
reduction in per capita CO2 
transport emissions in an 
average year.  
3.6% 
Denmark, 
Finland, 
Netherlands, 
Norway, 
Sweden 
Lin and Li, 
2011122 
Incep-
tion to 
2008 
Significant negative impact on 
the growth of per capita CO2 
emissions in Finland. Negative, 
but not significant, impact on 
per capita CO2 emissions in 
Denmark, Sweden and 
Netherlands. Insignificant 
positive impact in Norway. 
 
Austria, 
Denmark, 
Finland, Italy, 
Netherlands, 
Sweden and 
UK 
Mideksa and 
Kallbekken, 
undated123 
 
 
Incep-
tion to 
2008 
Carbon taxes led to statistically 
significant reductions in CO2 
emissions only for Sweden and 
the UK (the Climate Change 
Levy).  
 
 
 118.  Annegrete Bruvoll & Bodil Merethe Larsen, Greenhouse Gas Emissions in Norway - 
Do Carbon Taxes Work, 32 ENERGY POL’Y 500, § 5, 9 (2004). 
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Carbon Tax 
Jurisdiction 
Time 
Period Emission Reductions 
Reduction 
per Year 
Denmark, 
Finland, 
Germany, 
Netherlands, 
Slovenia, 
Sweden and 
UK 
Andersen, 
2010124 
1994–
2003 
Review of available studies of 
the impacts of environmental 
tax reforms finds no change in 
GHG emissions in Slovenia, an 
average reduction of 3.1% in 
the other six countries with the 
largest reduction (5.9%) in 
Finland 
 
<1% 
 
The national estimates, including those summarized by Andersen, 
indicate that the respective carbon taxes reduced business-as-usual 
emissions by less than 2% per year. That likely is less than the rate of 
growth of business-as-usual emissions. It is not surprising, then, that 
taxed emissions during this period increased in Denmark and Norway 
although they declined in Sweden (see Annex 1).125 
The two econometric studies spanning multiple countries yield 
inconsistent results in terms of the countries whose taxes significantly 
affect CO2 emissions. They specify different countries as having a 
carbon tax and consequently different countries as being part of the 
 
 119.  Andersen et al., supra note 115, at 58. 
 120.  Folke Bohlin, The Swedish Carbon Dioxide Tax: Effects on Biofuel Use and Carbon 
Dioxide Emissions, 15 BIOMASS AND BIOENERGY 283, 283 (1998). The estimated abatement of 
0.5 to 1.5 million tons CO2 on a yearly basis is equivalent to a 1.5% to 4.5% reduction of emissions 
subject to the CO2 tax. 
 121.  Julius J. Andersson, Cars, Carbon Taxes and CO2 Emissions 32 (Grantham Research 
Inst. on Climate Change & the Env’t, Working Paper No. 212, 2017). Statistics Sweden reports 
that the population increased from 8,590,630 in 1990 to 9,047,752 in 2005, an increase of 5.3% 
over the period. Statistics Sweden, Population and Population Changes 1749–2017, 
https://www.scb.se/en/finding-statistics/statistics-by-subject-area/population/population-
composition/population-statistics/pong/tables-and-graphs/yearly-statistics--the-whole-country/ 
population-and-population-changes/. For an average year, the 6.3% reduction in per capita 
transport emissions would be partially offset by a 2.6% increase in population, resulting in a 3.9% 
reduction in actual CO2 transport emissions.  
 122.  Lin & Li, supra note 13, at 5144. 
 123.  MIDEKSA & KALLBEKKEN, supra note 13, at 5 (“[A]lthough carbon taxes fail to reduce 
emissions in most countries, the results for Sweden and the U.K. suggest the presence of a 
statistically significant and negative relationship between carbon taxes and CO2 emissions.”). 
 124.  Andersen, supra note 13, at 4 fig.2. 
 125.  Estimations of taxed emissions for Finland are unavailable. 
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control group.126 They also specify different control groups.127 Their 
dependent variables—total and per capita CO2 emissions—include 
many emissions sources not subject to the carbon taxes.128 Both studies 
find that few of the taxes led to a significant reduction in business-as-
usual emissions. Reductions of business-as-usual emissions are not 
systematically related to reductions in actual emissions.129 
All of the studies conclude that the European carbon taxes 
reduced emissions relative to business-as-usual, but the annual 
reductions are relatively small. As a result, actual emissions subject to 
the carbon taxes continued to rise in most of these countries. Although 
it relates to the Norwegian carbon tax, the following statement 
succinctly summarizes the early European carbon tax experience: “the 
taxes as they are executed have limited effect, and the sectors where 
the tax would have been efficient, are exempted.”130 
3. European carbon taxes and other policies since 2008 
Almost all of the countries with a carbon tax have been part of the 
EU ETS since 2008.131 With the exception of the Carbon Price Floor in 
the UK, the carbon taxes apply almost exclusively to non-ETS 
emissions. This creates a natural experiment: changes in non-ETS 
emissions can be compared for the group of countries with a carbon tax 
and the group without a tax. Carbon taxes should yield larger 
reductions in non-ETS emissions for the group with taxes. For 
individual countries where we have data, estimates of changes in taxed 
emissions can be compared with changes in non-ETS emissions. 
Carbon taxes should reduce taxed emissions more than non-ETS 
emissions. 
 
 
 126.  Compare Lin & Li, supra note 13, at 5140 (including Austria in the control group), with 
MIDEKSA & KALLBEKKEN, supra note 13, at 3 (considering Austria to have a carbon tax). 
 127.  Compare Lin & Li, supra note 13, at 5140 (including only European OECD countries in 
the control group), with MIDEKSA & KALLBEKKEN, supra note 13 at 3 (including European and 
non-European OECD members in the control group). 
 128.  Compare Lin & Li, supra note 13, at 5140 (using per capita CO2 emissions as their 
dependent variable), with MIDEKSA & KALLBEKKEN, supra note 13, at 3 (using total CO2 
emissions as their dependent variable). 
 129.  If business-as-usual emissions are rising rapidly statistically significant reductions may 
not be sufficient to lower actual emissions subject to the carbon tax. If business-as-usual emissions 
are growing slowly (or declining), statistically insignificant reductions could lower actual 
emissions. 
 130.  Bruvoll & Larsen, supra note 118, at 501. 
 131.  See supra Table 1. Japan and Switzerland have a tax but are not part of the EU ETS. 
Croatia is not included in the non-tax group because it did not join the EU ETS until 2013. 
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Excluding the UK, thirteen countries that participate in the EU 
ETS have a carbon tax, including countries for which we do not have 
data on emissions subject to the carbon tax. 132  Three of those 
countries—Iceland, Liechtenstein, and Norway—are not part of the 
EU. Sixteen countries that participate in the EU ETS do not have a 
carbon tax.133 The countries with a carbon tax account for roughly 33% 
of the total GHG emissions (excluding LULUCF) and 34% of the non-
ETS emissions of the 29 countries. Several of the carbon taxes were 
introduced after 2008; when comparing rates of emission reduction 
since 2008, this favors carbon taxes. 
The EU effort-sharing allocations provide a rough indication of 
the comparability of the tax and non-tax groups in terms of their 
expected reductions in non-ETS emissions. The effort-sharing 
allocations are national targets for reduction of non-ETS emissions 
from 2013 through 2020.134 The allocations reflect politically negotiated 
judgments on equity, emission reduction potential and other 
considerations. Since they are not member states, the effort-sharing 
allocations do not apply to Iceland, Liechtenstein, and Norway, leaving 
10 countries in the tax group with such allocations. In aggregate, the 
annual reductions in non-ETS emissions required from the 10 tax 
countries exceed those of the group without a tax by -1.16% to -
0.98%.135 In short, the two groups are reasonably comparable although 
the tax countries are expected to achieve slightly larger annual 
reductions in their non-ETS emissions. 
The EU member states are expected to meet their effort-sharing 
allocations with EU-wide, national and sub-national policies. EU-wide 
policies that help reduce non-ETS emissions include CO2 standards for 
 
 132.  See MÉTIVIER ET AL., supra note 27, at 3 (listing jurisdictions with carbon taxes, 
including thirteen which participate in the EU ETS: Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Iceland, 
Ireland, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Poland, Portugal, Norway, Slovenia, and Sweden). The UK is 
excluded because its Carbon Price Floor applies to emissions covered by the EU ETS. David 
Hirst, Carbon Price Floor (CPF) and the Price Support Mechanism 7 (House of Commons 
Library, Briefing Paper No. 05927, 2018). 
 133.  Austria, Belguim, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, 
Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Romania, Slovakia, and Spain. 
 134.  Decision 406/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009, 2009 
O.J. (L 140) 137; Commission Decision 2013/634, annex I, 2013 O.J. (L 292) 21 (EC). The policy 
came into effect in 2013, so earlier data are not available. The 2013 to 2020 period is assumed to 
provide a better comparison of the comparability of the tax and non-tax groups. 
 135.  See Commission Decision 2013/634, annex I, 2013 O.J. (L 292) 21 (EU) (providing the 
adjustments to Member States’ annual emission allocations for the period from 2013 to 2020). 
Among the countries with a carbon tax, the national allocations range from -3.08% per year for 
Ireland to +1.09% per year for Latvia. For non-tax countries, the national allocations range from 
-5.53% per year for Cyprus to +2.13% per year for Romania. 
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road vehicles and standards for buildings and energy-related products. 
Member states, their sub-national jurisdictions, public entities, and 
private entities are expected to implement additional measures, which 
may include a carbon tax, to meet their allocation. The rates of change 
of non-ETS emissions for 2008–16 were -1.10% per year for the 13 
countries with a carbon tax and -1.28% per year for the 16 countries 
without a tax.136 Thus, despite having implemented carbon taxes, non-
ETS emissions declined less in the countries with a tax suggesting that 
other policies and developments contributed to the emission 
reductions in all of the countries. 
A recent evaluation of the Swiss carbon tax used two different 
models and a large survey of taxed and tax-exempt businesses to 
estimate its impact on emissions.137 All three approaches estimated that 
the tax reduced emissions. Cumulative reductions to 2015 are 
estimated at 4.1 to 8.6 MtCO2 (3.5% to 7.0%) with relatively larger 
reductions in 2015 (0.8 to 1.8 MtCO2, 4.3% to 9.6%) due to increases 
in the tax rate. The residential sector accounts for about 75% of the 
reductions. One of the models was used to analyze the impact of other 
measures and concluded that they accounted for about 25% of the 
emission reductions in 2015. 
The rates of change in non-ETS emissions and taxed emissions for 
specific countries are compared in Table 6. In most of the countries, 
taxed emissions represent a large share of the non-ETS emissions. If 
the decline in taxed emissions exceeds the decline in non-ETS 
emissions, the tax is likely helping to reduce the non-ETS emissions. If 
non-ETS emissions decline faster than the taxed emissions, the policies 
and other factors responsible for the decline in the non-ETS emissions 
likely helped to reduce the taxed emissions as well. In only one of the 
seven countries—Denmark—did the taxed emissions decline more 
than the non-ETS emissions, again suggesting that other policies and 
developments contributed to the reduction of taxed emissions. 
 
 
 
 
 136.  The recession of 2009 led to a substantial decline in emissions for 2009 with a partial 
recovery in 2010. Rates of change calculated from 2008 are not impacted by the effects of the 
recession. 
 137.  See generally Bundesamt für Umwelt BAFU, Faktenblatt Wirkungsabschätzung und 
Evaluation der CO2-Abgabe auf Brennstoffe (Feb. 19, 2018) (Switz.), 
https://www.bafu.admin.ch/dam/bafu/de/dokumente/klima/fachinfo-daten/ 
wirkungsabschaetzungco2-abgabefaktenblatt.pdf. 
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Table 6. Annual Rates of Change in non-ETS Emissions and 
Taxed Emissions Selected Countries and Periods 
Country Period 
Change 
in non-
ETS 
emissions 
Change 
in taxed 
emissions 
Taxed as % of 
non-ETS 
emissions 2016 
Denmark 2008–
2016 
-1.96 -10.61 67% 
Iceland 2010–
2016 
-8.37 -3.08 101% 
Ireland 2010–
2016 
-0.05 2.76 42% 
Norway 2008–
2016 
-3.03 -2.49 57% 
Slovenia 2008–
2016 
-1.68 15.93 70% 
Sweden 2008–
2016 
-3.18 -2.13 64% 
Switzerland 2013–
2016 
-2.46 -2.13 29% 
 
The EU climate and energy package that became law early in 2009 
comprised of legislation to reduce EU GHG emissions by at least 20% 
below 1990 levels by 2020, supply at least 20% of EU energy 
consumption from renewable resources by 2020, and improve energy 
efficiency by at least 20% relative to projected levels by 2020. Energy 
efficiency and renewable energy measures implemented by residential, 
commercial, and small industrial facilities would contribute to lower 
taxed emissions. 
In summary, while taxed emissions have declined since 2008 in 
several European countries, non-ETS emissions, with the exception of 
those of Denmark, have experienced larger reductions. This suggests 
that other policies and developments probably have contributed 
substantially to the observed reductions in taxed emissions in countries 
that have implemented carbon taxes. 
C. Why have carbon taxes had such limited impact on emissions? 
A carbon tax should increase the prices of emitting activities, 
providing an incentive to consumers to shift to less polluting activities. 
If the tax is to be effective, the tax rate must be sufficiently high to 
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motivate consumers to change their consumption patterns. If the 
emission reductions are to be sustained, or increased, the tax rate must 
be adjusted for inflation, increases in income, and the effects of 
technological change. This section argues that, with few exceptions, tax 
rates have been too low to have a significant impact on consumption 
patterns, tax rates often are not adjusted with the frequency and scale 
needed to sustain or increase the emission reductions, and the 
empirical relationship between tax rate increases and emission 
reductions is not well understood. 
1. Tax rates 
Carbon taxes are applied mainly to transportation fuels and fossil 
fuels used for residential, commercial, and institutional heating.138 In 
most jurisdictions, these fuels are subject to excise and other taxes 
regardless of whether they are also subject to a carbon tax. The price 
signal to the consumer is the effect of the carbon tax on the retail price, 
including all other taxes. In a few jurisdictions, Finland and Sweden for 
example, the introduction of the carbon tax was accompanied by a 
corresponding reduction in the amount of excise tax. In those cases, the 
carbon tax has no impact on the retail price until the carbon tax exceeds 
the excise tax reduction. 
The price elasticity of demand measures the consumer response to 
a change in the price of a product. For transportation fuels the price 
elasticity is low (highly inelastic) in the short run and more elastic in 
the long run.139 This means that the initial response to a price increase 
is small, but a larger adjustment will occur over time if the price 
increase is sustained. In other words, to produce a noticeable reduction 
in emissions from the consumption of gasoline and diesel fuel, a carbon 
tax must have a substantial impact on the retail prices of these fuels. 
Table 7 shows carbon taxes as a share of diesel fuel prices in various 
European countries for 2005–14.140 
 
 
 
 
 
 138.  See WORLD BANK P’SHIP FOR MARKET READINESS, supra note 1, at 76–77 tbl.16 
(detailing the scope of various planned carbon taxes). 
 139.  See Xavier Labandeira et al., A Meta-Analysis on the Price Elasticity of Energy Demand, 
102 ENERGY POL’Y 549, 553 tbl.4 (2017) (finding the average short- and long-term price 
elasticities of car fuels to be 0.180 and 0.372, respectively). 
 140.  The diesel fuel price data are not available after 2014. 
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Table 7. Carbon Tax as a Share of Diesel Fuel Price 2005–14 for 
Selected Countries 
Country Carbon tax 
(USD/liter) 
Diesel price 
(USD/liter) 
Tax as % of 
price 
Denmark 0.04 to 0.08 1.45 to 1.89 2.80% to 
4.42% 
Iceland 0.02 to 0.03 1.45 to 1.89 0.70% to 
1.38% 
Ireland 0.05 to 0.07 1.31 to 2.06 3.15% to 3.86% 
Norway 0.08 to 0.14 1.69 to 2.35 
4.41% to 
6.65% 
Slovenia 0.04 to 0.05 1.21 to 1.77 2.43% to 
3.83% 
Sweden 0.33 to 0.43 1.44 to 2.16 19.22% to 26.62% 
 
With the exception of Sweden, the carbon tax is less than 5% of 
the retail price and is relatively constant over time. Sweden has the 
highest carbon tax rates (see Table 1), so those results are not 
surprising. Comparison of the carbon tax (second column) with the 
range of diesel prices (third column) indicates that the tax is 
substantially smaller than fluctuations in the retail price even in 
Sweden. In short, the European carbon taxes, with the exception of 
Sweden, constitute a small, relatively fixed share of the diesel fuel price 
that is lost in the “noise” of price changes. Therefore, they are unlikely 
to have stimulated an appreciable reduction in related emissions. 
Fossil fuels used for residential, commercial, and institutional 
heating typically are not as heavily taxed as transportation fuels, so a 
given tax rate would generate a larger price signal for consumers. 
However, research into the adoption of energy efficiency measures 
indicates that many market barriers inhibit adjustments to energy price 
increases, so the emissions reductions due to a carbon tax may be 
smaller and slower to materialize than projected.141 
 
 141.  See Nadia Ameli & Nicola Brandt, What Impedes Household Investment in Energy 
Efficiency and Renewable Energy, 8 INT’L REV. ENVTL. & RESOURCE ECON. 101, 129 tbl.1 (2014) 
(citing energy prices as a barrier to energy investment and policy solutions); Todd D. Gerarden 
et al., Assessing the Energy-Efficiency Gap, 55 J. ECON. LITERATURE 1486, 1486–87 (2017) 
(“[T]here is a broadly held view that various barriers to the adoption of energy-efficient 
technologies have prevented the realization of a substantial portion of these benefits.”); Kenneth 
Gillingham & Karen Palmer, Bridging the Energy Efficiency Gap: Policy Insights from Economic 
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Other emitting activities subject to carbon taxes are more sensitive 
to price changes (more price elastic), but only limited information is 
available. The UK carbon price floor applies to fossil fuels used to 
generate electricity and changes the “merit order,” the sequence in 
which generating units that use different fossil fuels are used. It was the 
key driver behind the rapid decline of coal-fired generation since 2013 
because the tax makes many coal-fired units more costly to operate 
than gas-fired units.142  Australia’s carbon pricing mechanism led to 
similar changes in the mix of generating units used there.143 In a similar 
vein, replacement of coal by biofuel in the district heating sector was 
the largest source of emission reductions attributed to the Swedish 
carbon tax during its early years.144 
2. Scale and frequency of tax rate changes 
Jurisdictions that implement a carbon tax must adjust the tax rate over 
time to achieve their emission reduction objectives. Inflation and 
increases in income reduce the effectiveness of a given tax rate over 
time. Technological change, fossil fuel price changes, and other 
developments can also reduce the effectiveness of a give tax rate over 
time. Thus, to sustain or increase the emission reductions due to a 
carbon tax, the tax rate must rise over time. Data on the scale and 
frequency of tax rate changes are presented in Table 8. For most of the 
taxes, the increases in the tax rate have exceeded the rate of inflation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Theory and Empirical Evidence, 8 REV. ENVTL. ECON. & POL’Y 18, 19 (2014) (“[M]arket 
failures . . . can lead to inefficiently low levels of investment in energy efficiency.”). 
 142.  See AURORA ENERGY RESEARCH, THE CARBON PRICE THAW: POST-FREEZE FUTURE 
OF THE GB CARBON PRICE 4 (2017) (stating that Great Britain’s Carbon Price Support (“CPS”), 
a component of its Carbon Price Floor (“CPF”), “was the key driver behind the rapid decline of 
coal generation since 2013”). 
 143.  See Marianna O’Gorman & Frank Jotzo, Impact of the Carbon Price on Australia’s 
Electricity Demand, Supply and Emissions 26–28 (Ctr. for Climate Econ. & Pol’y, Working Paper 
No. 1411, 2014) (discussing the significant impact that Australia’s carbon price has had on the 
brown and black coal markets). 
 144.  Bohlin, supra note 120, at 289. 
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Table 8. Scale and Frequency of Tax Rate Changes 
Jurisdiction/tax 
Years 
of data 
Average 
annual 
change to 
the tax 
rate (%) 
Average 
annual 
rate of 
inflation 
over the 
same 
period 
Percent of 
years with 
no rate 
increase 
after the 
first 5 
years 
Longest 
period 
with no 
increase 
(years) 
Norway      
CO2-tax on 
mineral oil 
22 3.74 3.45% 0% 0 
Tax on offshore 
CO2 emissions 
17 -2.41 3.56% 44% 3 
Tax on 
fluorinated gases 
13 5.98 3.37% 0% 0 
Sweden 23 5.64 1.68% 52% 5 
Denmark      
Duty on CO2 23 2.96 1.38% 56% 11 
Fluorinated gases 
tax 
3 0.00 0.56%  4 
Slovenia      
Tax on CO2 17 1.92 4.73% 79% 14 
Fluorinated gases 
tax 
6 18.47 0.96%  1 
British Columbia 8 14.72 1.03% 100% 4 
Switzerland 8 27.54 -0.12% 25% 2 
Liechtenstein 8 27.54 -0.12% 25% 2 
Ireland      
Natural gas and 
liquids carbon tax 
6 4.68 1.55%  2 
Solid fuel carbon 
tax 
3 4.88 2.19%  1 
Iceland 6 7.80 3.27%  1 
Japan 4 44.90 0.94%  1 
United Kingdom 2 91.31 1.20%  0 
France 2 51.72 0.68%  0 
Source. Calculated from data in Annex 1. Inflation rates calculated from World 
Bank data on GDP 
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Over the past decade, several jurisdictions, including British 
Columbia, France, Japan, and the UK have phased in a carbon tax over 
a period of three to five years with large percentage increases every 
year or two over that period. Carbon taxes that have been in effect 
longer have much smaller average annual increases. Norway adjusts its 
tax rates, including its carbon tax rates, for the effect of inflation each 
year. These increases have not been sufficient to reduce taxed 
emissions. Iceland and Ireland have raised their tax rates at one- or 
two-year intervals, as has Slovenia for its fluorinated gases tax. 
Switzerland has adjusted its tax rate, which also applies in 
Liechtenstein, at two- or three-year intervals in an effort to achieve its 
emission reduction target with a substantial rate increase on each 
occasion. Tax rate changes in other jurisdictions appear to be more ad 
hoc. 
Despite the annual increases to the Norwegian tax rates, the 
frequent increases in Switzerland, and the increases during the phase-
in periods in other jurisdictions, tax rates rise only about 60% of the 
time on a year-over-year basis. This reflects the fact that governments 
change and that a given government faces environmental, economic 
and political pressures as it considers a tax rate increase. Even 
announced schedules of tax rate increase are subject to change. When 
the UK carbon price floor was introduced in April 2013, it was 
scheduled to rise yearly to £30/tCO2 in 2020 but was capped at £18/tCO2 
from 2016 in the 2014 budget.145 
3. Changes to carbon tax rates and associated changes in 
emissions 
To examine the relationship between changes in tax rates and 
changes in emissions, we identify periods with rising tax rates—at least 
four years with no more than one year without an increase. The annual 
rates of change for the tax rate and emissions are calculated for each of 
the eleven periods. The periods range in length from four to 22 years. 
The emissions changes are calculated for the same periods as the tax 
rate changes. The time period for which emission reductions are 
calculated should lag the time period during which rates rise, but we do 
not know the appropriate lag. In theory, the longer the time period, the 
 
 145.  See Hirst, supra note 132, at 3 (“At Budget 2014 the Government announced that the 
CPS component of the floor price would be capped at a maximum of £18/tCO2 from 2016 to 2020 
to limit the competitive disadvantage faced by business and reduce energy bills for consumers. 
This price freeze was extended to 2021 in Budget 2016.”). 
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larger the share of emissions reductions should occur during the same 
period.146 
Higher rates of tax rate increases would be expected to lead to 
greater emission reductions. The annual rates of changes to tax rates 
and emissions are shown in Figure 1. The expected relationship would 
be a curve sloping downward to the right. Low rates of tax rate increase 
might not be sufficient to reduce actual emissions, so for tax rate 
increases near the origin emissions might not decline (be above the 
horizontal axis). For high rates of tax rate increase, annual emissions 
would be expected to decline (be below the horizontal axis).  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Clearly, the data relating to the existing carbon taxes do not fall 
neatly into the expected pattern. For tax rate changes of up to 30% per 
year, emissions increases (5 cases) are almost twice as common as 
emissions reductions (3 cases). The effects of other policies on 
emissions subject to carbon taxes may be part of the explanation, but 
more research into the relationship between tax rate changes and 
emissions reductions is needed. 
 
 146.  If the lag is two years, a four-year period only captures the full effect of the tax rate 
change during the first two years, but a 22-year period captures the full impact for the tax rate 
changes during the first 20 years. 
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D. Summary 
We were able to compile emissions data for 17 carbon taxes in 12 
jurisdictions. Only six of the 17 taxes have reduced actual emissions 
subject to the tax—Denmark (duty on CO2), Japan, Slovenia 
(fluorinated gases), Sweden, Switzerland and the UK. The rates of 
change of taxed emissions vary widely, from a reduction of over 42% 
per year for the UK carbon price floor to an increase of more than 24% 
per year for fluorinated gases in Denmark. 
Multiple assessments of European carbon taxes implemented 
prior to 2008 and of the British Columbia carbon tax consistently find 
that carbon taxes have reduced emissions relative to business-as-usual. 
These assessments cover fewer taxes for shorter periods than our 
estimates of changes in taxed emissions. Our estimates of taxed 
emissions indicate that the reductions from business-as-usual were not 
large enough to reduce actual emissions except in the case of Sweden. 
We found only one post-2008 evaluation of a European carbon 
tax: the Swiss tax. Comparison of post-2008 data on non-ETS emissions 
and taxed emissions in European countries that participate in the EU 
ETS suggests that other policies and developments contributed to the 
reduction of taxed emissions in most of those countries. The evaluation 
of the Swiss carbon tax estimates the contribution of other policies at 
about 25%. 
Tax rates, with the exception of Sweden and Switzerland, are 
probably too low to materially affect emissions by most taxed sources. 
Only the tax rates in Sweden, Switzerland, Liechtenstein, and Finland 
exceed the carbon price thought to be needed in 2020 to hold the global 
average temperature increase to well below 2°C above pre-industrial 
levels, in line with the Paris Agreement. 147  To sustain or increase 
emission reductions, tax rates need to be adjusted regularly to 
compensate for inflation, income increases and other factors. In most 
jurisdictions, the scale and frequency of the rate changes has not been 
sufficient to stimulate further emissions reductions. 
V. REDUCTION IN EMISSIONS SUBJECT TO GHG ETSS 
This section calculates changes in emissions covered by various 
GHG ETSs, considers the relationship between changes in emissions 
 
 147.  See WORLD BANK, supra note 25, at 34 (“Currently, only the carbon taxes in Finland, 
Lichtenstein, Sweden and Switzerland have carbon price rates that are consistent with the 2020 
price range recommended by the High–Level Commission on Carbon Prices.”); WORLD BANK 
CARBON PRICING LEADERSHIP COAL., supra note 77, at 51 (referring to the Paris Agreement 
2030 temperature increase target of “well below 2ºC”). 
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caps and changes in emissions, and reviews other assessments of the 
performance of GHG trading systems. 
A. Changes in emissions covered by GHG ETSs 
Most ETSs report aggregate data on the allowances and offsets 
surrendered and financial payments made for compliance. We used 
that information to calculate the verified emissions covered by the 
ETSs. 148  As discussed in section III.A, the amounts are actual 
emissions with no adjustments for leakage or emission changes due to 
use of the ETS revenue. In a few jurisdictions—California, European 
Union, Quebec and Switzerland—there have been significant changes 
in the scope of the ETS. These are treated as separate ETSs for 
purposes of the analysis. The aviation component of the EU ETS 
likewise is treated as a separate ETS because it has its own allowances. 
The annual rates of reduction are calculated using the actual 
emissions for the first year as the base because pre-ETS emissions data 
are not always available, and where available, are sometimes 
considered to be inflated. This approach excludes reductions during 
the first year of the ETS. Annual emissions data sometimes are not 
available for ETSs with multi-year compliance periods such as RGGI; 
then we use the data for the first period as the basis for calculating the 
second period reductions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 148.  The verified emissions, in tCO2e, are equal to the sum of the allowances and other units 
surrendered to achieve compliance plus the emissions covered by fixed price compliance 
payments in Alberta and New Zealand. For the New Zealand ETS, the figure was doubled to get 
the verified emissions because compliance required submission of one allowance for emissions of 
two tCO2e. 
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Table 9. Annual Rates of Change in Emissions Caps and 
Emissions Covered by GHG ETSs for Selected Periods149 
 
 
Jurisdiction 
 
Period 
Average 
Annual 
Change in 
Emissions 
Cap    
%/year 
 
Average 
Annual 
Emission 
Change 
%/year 
 
Period 
Average 
Annual 
Change in 
Emissions 
Cap    
%/year 
 
Average 
Annual 
Emission 
Change 
%/year 
European 
Union 
2008–
2012 0 -1.61 
2013–
2016 -1.87 -4.14 
EU ETS 
Aviation 
2012–
2016 
0 -7.58    
Alberta 2007–
2013 
NA 2.51    
New 
Zealand 
2011–
2016 
NA 6.50    
Switzerland 2008–
2012 
1.48 -1.98 2013–
2016 
-0.72 -4.52 
RGGI 2012–
2014 
-9.27 -6.40    
Tokyo* 
2010–
2015 
NA -3.03    
Saitama* 
2011–
2014 NA -1.36 
 
 
 
  
* These are rates of change for energy use because the carbon content of 
electricity is assumed to be constant. The carbon content of electricity rose as a 
result of greater reliance on fossil-fired generation due to the shutdown of most 
nuclear generators after the 2011 great east Japan earthquake and tsunami.  
  
The annual rates of change in emissions covered by the ETSs are 
summarized in Table 9. The data cover forty-five jurisdictions; the 
seven Chinese pilots are not included because they treat emissions data 
 
149. Calculated from individual ETSs data for allowances/offsets surrendered, emissions 
caps, and banked allowances. Data are reported by the individual ETSs. See Alberta 
(http://aep.alberta.ca/climate-change/reports-and-data/default.aspx); California (https://arb.ca. 
gov/cc/inventory/data/data.htm); EU ETS (https://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ets/ 
registry_en#tab-0-1); New Zealand ETS Annual Reports and Facts and Figures 
(https://www.epa.govt.nz/resources-and-publications/monitoring-and-reporting/?tag=73); 
Quebec (http://www.mddelcc.gouv.qc.ca/changements/carbone/Couverture-en.htm); RGGI 
(https://www.rggi.org/allowance-tracking/emissions); Switzerland (https://www.emissionsregistry. 
admin.ch/crweb/public/reporting/surrendering/list.do?org.apache.struts.taglib.html.TOKEN=5a
bfbed80e6880a2d258fc5d448a684a); Tokyo (http://www.metro.tokyo.jp/ENGLISH/TOPICS/ 
2016/161116.htm). For more detailed data see Masayo Wakabayashi & Osamu Kimura, The 
Impact of the Tokyo Metropolitan Emissions Trading Scheme on Reducing Greenhouse Gas 
Emissions: Findings From A Facility-Based Study, 18 Climate Pol’y 1028, 1034 fig.2 (2018). 
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as confidential. Quebec, which only reports data by compliance period, 
and South Korea, where the results of the first compliance period have 
not yet been reported, also are excluded. We exclude California from 
the table because the rates of change are calculated over one or two 
years and hence may not be indicative. The data for the two regional 
ETSs—EU ETS and RGGI—are aggregate, rather than jurisdiction-
specific, emissions. Thus, we have data for eight ETSs, but for two of 
them there are two periods with different coverage yielding a total of 
ten jurisdictions/ETS combinations. 
Actual emissions have fallen in at least six of the ETSs covering 41 
jurisdictions, with annual rates of emission reductions up to 6.4%. 
Emissions increased in Alberta, New Zealand, and possibly in Tokyo 
and Saitama—notably the four ETSs that do not have an emissions cap. 
The fact that actual emissions increased does not mean the ETS had no 
impact on emissions, just that the impact was not sufficient to reduce 
actual emissions given other developments. 
The Alberta Specified Gas Emitters Regulation (SGER) applied 
to installations with emissions in excess of 100 ktCO2e. 150  An 
installation subject to the SGER was required to reduce emissions-
intensity per unit of production by a specified percentage relative to its 
historic baseline.151 Aggregate emissions were not capped. The growth 
in actual emissions was due, in part, to an increase in the number of 
installations subject to the regulation and increased output by 
participants. 
The New Zealand ETS does not have an emissions cap. 152 
Participants are required to submit eligible domestic and international 
allowances and offsets equal to half of their actual emissions.153 Until 
2015 there was no limit on the use of international allowances and 
offsets. Beginning in 2010, the prices of those units fell significantly 
with the result that they accounted for over 95% of the units 
 
 150.  In 2018 the Alberta SGER was replaced by the Carbon Competitiveness Incentive 
Regulation (CCIR). Alta. Reg. 255/2017 (Can.). For a discussion of the CCIR, see generally 
Mascher, supra note 15. 
 151.  See id. at 1015 (“The SGER required covered facilities to reduce emissions-intensity 
(emissions per unit of production) by a specified percentage (12% in 2007–14; 15% in 2016; 20% 
in 2017) relative to their historic performance.”). 
 152.  See Catherine Leining et al., Evolution of New Zealand Emissions Trading Scheme: 
Linking Lessons Learned from the New Zealand Emissions Trading Scheme 1 (Motu Econ. & Pub. 
Pol’y Res., Working Paper No. 17-06, 2017) (explaining that, as of 2017, “no cap has applied to 
the issuance of domestic units” under the New Zealand ETS). 
 153.  See id. at 17 (discussing the 2009 New Zealand ETS amendments that “introduce[d] a 
‘one-for-two’ unit obligation to limit exposure of non-forestry sectors to half of the international 
emissions price through 2012”). 
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surrendered for compliance from 2012 through 2014. 154  Use of 
international allowances and offsets was banned after 2014.155 
The Tokyo and Saitama ETSs claim emission reductions, but 
actual emissions may have increased. Electricity accounts for a large 
share of the emissions covered by these ETSs for which a constant 
carbon intensity is assumed.156 The great east Japan earthquake and 
tsunami of 2011 led to the gradual shutdown of all nuclear generating 
stations and greater reliance on fossil-fired generation which increased 
the carbon intensity of electricity supplied to Tokyo and Saitama.157  
Unfortunately, the share of total emissions due to electricity use is 
not available for either ETS, so the impact on actual emissions cannot 
be calculated. Entity-specific emissions data for 985 facilities covered 
by the Tokyo ETS from 2010 through 2015 suggest a small increase in 
actual emissions due to the change in the generation mix.158 
California is excluded from Table 9 because the time periods over 
which emission changes can be calculated are very short, so the trends 
may not be meaningful. Although it has multi-year compliance periods, 
California publishes annual emissions of entities subject to its ETS.  
Our standard approach of using the first year as the base for 
calculating emission changes yields only a one-year change (a 0.40% 
increase) for the first compliance period and (a 1.68% decline) for the 
second period. Using data for the year prior to the start of each phase 
yields two-year annual reductions of -4.81% and -2.79% respectively 
 
 154.  Haites, supra note 37, at 253 tbl.2. 
 155.  See N.Z. MINISTRY FOR THE ENV’T, supra note 41, at 26 (“The New Zealand carbon 
market had full exposure to international markets up to the end of 2014.”). Proposed changes to 
the New Zealand ETS set the supply of allowances on a rolling, five-year basis consistent with 
New Zealand’s emissions target, introduce auctioning, and phase-in a one unit per tCO2 
compliance obligation between 2017 and 2019. See N.Z. MINISTRY FOR THE ENV’T, 
IMPROVEMENTS TO THE NEW ZEALAND EMISSIONS TRADING SCHEME: CONSULTATION 
DOCUMENT 9–13 (Aug. 2018) (discussing proposed changes to the New Zealand ETS that the 
government currently seeks to introduce through legislative amendments by the end of 2019). 
 156.  That assumption means the reported reductions are changes in energy use, rather than 
changes in emissions. 
 157.  See Wakabayashi & Kimura, supra note 149, at 1030 (“The carbon intensity of electricity 
increased after the earthquake in 2011 due to the shutdown of nuclear of nuclear plants, which 
led to a greater use of fossil-fuel generation.”). 
 158.  An analysis of compliance reports submitted by 985 facilities subject to the Tokyo ETS 
for the 2010–15 period indicates that the emissions intensity of electricity supplied to the Tokyo 
region increased as a result of greater reliance on fossil-fired generation leading to an estimated 
increase in emissions by those facilities of 0.35% per year. The impact on total emissions covered 
by the ETS is not known due to changes in the number of participating facilities. For more on the 
impact of the great east Japan earthquake and tsunami on emissions subject to the Tokyo ETS, 
see id. at 1038–39. 
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for the two compliance periods. The ETS designs vary widely in terms 
of compliance period, price stability mechanisms, use of offsets, and 
other features. Yet when ETSs without an emissions cap are excluded, 
actual emissions have fallen.  
Other policies, including vehicle fuel taxes, energy efficiency 
standards, and renewable energy incentives, contributed to the 
emission reductions. 159  External factors, including changes in fuel 
prices and economic conditions, also had an impact. The recession and 
financial crisis led to a drop in emissions during 2009 in several ETSs. 
Additionally, a decline in natural gas prices in the US due to shale gas 
production led to fuel switching and lower emissions by RGGI 
participants. 
B. Changes in emissions and emissions caps 
Most jurisdictions that implement a GHG ETS limit the aggregate 
emissions by participants. When such an ETS is first implemented, the 
emissions cap tends to be generous for several reasons: 
• Participants lobby for a limit that requires minimal 
reductions to keep compliance costs low; 
• Equitable treatment of participants that implemented 
emission reductions prior to the start of the ETS often takes 
the form of early action credits or allocations that exceed 
actual emissions; and 
• The government may not have accurate data on historic 
emissions. 
Consequently, actual emissions are often less than the quantity of 
allowances distributed leading to the accumulation of a bank of unused 
allowances. The size of the allowance bank at any given time is difficult 
to determine—information on the units distributed is usually available 
but the quantity needed for compliance is not known for the same 
date.160 Estimates of the size of the allowance bank for different ETSs 
 
 159.  Data covering 28 EU ETS members from 2008–16 indicate annual rates of emissions 
change between +1.78% and -7.84% with an overall average of -2.89%. Emissions by country are 
calculated by summing the emissions of all installations in each country as reported to the Union 
Registry. See, e.g., EU ETS UNION REGISTRY, CORRECTED TABLE OF VERIFIED 2016 EMISSIONS 
(2016) (reporting annual emissions by installation from 2008 through 2016). All of these countries 
had the same ETS design and allowance prices during that period, so the different rates reflect 
differences in the mix of participants, local economic conditions, and other policies. 
 160.  The EU ETS, for example, distributes free allowances for the current year (say 2018) on 
February 28 and auctions other allowances at various times during the year. However, 
installations have until April 30 to surrender allowances to cover their actual emissions during the 
previous year (2017) and may use allowances already issued for the current year for that purpose, 
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are provided in Table 10. All of these ETSs have accumulated 
allowance banks. The banks range in size from 15% to over 500% (five 
years) of the annual compliance obligation. 
Table 10. Estimates of allowance banks accumulated by GHG 
ETSs 
  
 
so it is difficult to calculate the number of surplus units at any particular time. See EUROPEAN 
COMM’N, supra note 28, at 101 (describing the compliance cycle). 
 161.  See CHRIS BUSCH, ENERGY INNOVATION: POLICY & TECH. LLC, OVERSUPPLY 
GROWS IN WESTERN CLIMATE INITIATIVE CARBON MARKET: AN ADJUSTMENT FOR CURRENT 
OVERSUPPLY IS NEEDED TO ENSURE THE PROGRAM WILL ACHIEVE ITS 2030 TARGET 30 (2017) 
(“[T]he expected bank of allowances accumulated through 2020 is 26–45 percent of cumulative 
WCI cap declines 2021–30.”). 
Jurisdiction Period Bank Notes 
EU ETS 2005–
2007 
>15% Surplus allowances not valid 
for post 2007 compliance 
 
2008–
2016 >100% 
Use of Kyoto Protocol units 
restricted 
Switzerland 2008–
2012 
>100% 
Severe restrictions on post 
2012 use of surplus 2008-12 
units 
 2013–
2016 
>50% Use of Kyoto Protocol units 
restricted 
RGGI 2009–
2011 
>15% Unallocated and unsold 
allowances withdrawn 
 2012–
2014 
>50% Emissions cap reduced by 
over 25% 
New Zealand 2010–
2016 
>500% Use of Kyoto Protocol units 
banned after 2014. Bank 
peaked at over 600% in 
2015 
California and 
Quebec 
2013–
2016 
>45% Estimate by Busch, 2018 161 
Tokyo 2010–
2015 
>15%  
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 Note that in Table 10, “Bank” at the end of the period is expressed 
as a percentage of the annual compliance obligation – annual emissions 
except for New Zealand where the compliance obligation is one unit 
for two tCO2 emitted.  100% means that the banked units are equal to 
one year’s compliance obligation. 
ETSs have utilized several measures to reduce the number of 
banked allowances, including: 
• Effective cancellation of surplus allowances—cancellation of 
surplus European Union allowances (EUAs) at the end of 
Phase 1 of the EU ETS, severe restrictions on the quantity of 
2008–12 Swiss allowances (CHUs) that can be used for 2013–
20 compliance by Swiss ETS participants and withdrawal of 
unallocated and unsold units by state governments 
participating in RGGI; 
• Severe restrictions on compliance use of external offset 
credits—after 2012 compliance use of Kyoto Protocol units 
was severely restricted by the EU and Swiss ETSs, and New 
Zealand prohibited their use after 2014; 
• Larger reductions of the emissions cap—a reduction in the 
emissions cap by RGGI after 2009–12 and a shift from stable 
emissions limits to annual reductions in the limit by the 
California, EU, Quebec, RGGI and Swiss ETSs; and 
• Delayed distribution of allowances—the EU ETS 
“backloading” provision deferred the distribution of 
allowances from 2014–16 to 2019–20. 
In addition to the measures to reduce the allowance banks 
mentioned in Table 10, ETS designs have changed in ways that should 
reduce the accumulation of allowance banks. Many ETSs now have 
declining annual emissions caps, although the caps generally are 
declining more slowly than emissions (see Table 9).162 Market stability 
reserves to manage the size of allowance banks have been adopted by 
California-Quebec, EU and RGGI systems. While their designs differ, 
all of the stability reserves withdraw allowances from the market when 
the supply is abundant and release allowances if shortages arise. Data 
on the effectiveness of these mechanisms are not yet available. 
Governments clearly have been cautious in setting the limits for 
their ETSs. However, emission reductions have occurred in most of the 
ETSs despite the accumulation of surplus allowances. In effect, 
 
 162.  See Narassimhan et al., supra note 48, at 972 tbl.2 (displaying slight annual reductions in 
emissions caps across ETSs). 
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participants assume that the ETS will continue and that the allowances 
will be eligible for future compliance use despite instances where 
surplus allowances have been discounted or cancelled.163 
C. Other assessments of the performance of GHG ETSs 
This section summarizes the findings of other studies that have 
assessed the performance of various GHG ETSs.  
The California ETS has been criticized on the grounds that its 
treatment of imported electricity has led to leakage due to “resource 
shuffling”, and that the bulk of the emission reductions stem from 
command-and-control regulations that apply to sources covered by the 
ETS.164  
Evaluations of the New Zealand ETS concluded that it achieved 
only minimal reductions of net emissions below business-as-usual 
levels due to regulatory uncertainty and the ability to use unlimited 
quantities of low cost imported units for compliance.165  
Alberta’s SGER regulation was found to have “had no significant 
impact on annual emissions or the emission intensity of the average 
 
 163.  Cancelling or discounting distributed allowances leads to an economic loss for the 
allowance owners, but the financial loss may be small since most allowances are distributed for 
free. Provisions governing the distribution of free allowances differ by ETS and change over time. 
The EU ETS distributed over 95% of the allowances free during the first (2005–07) and second 
(2008–12) phases. During the third (2013–20) phase free allowances are provided to industry 
sectors deemed to be exposed to carbon leakage, while the free allocation to other industries 
declines from 80% to 30% and electricity generators get no free allowances. See EUROPEAN 
COMM’N, supra note 28, at 23–25). RGGI, which covers only fossil-fired electricity generation, 
auctions over 90% of its allowances. See RAMSEUR, supra note 97, at 2. California issues free 
allowances to industries but the allocations start to decline in 2018. Investor-owned electric and 
gas utilities get free allowances on behalf of their customers. During the first (2013–14) 
compliance period about 6% of the allowances were auctioned. See ICAP, USA CALIFORNIA 
CAP-AND TRADE PROGRAM 3 (2018). New Zealand provides intensity-based free allocation for 
eligible activities with 90% free allowances for highly EITE activities and 60% free allowances 
for moderately EITE activities. For the 2015–16 fiscal year, about 64% of allowances were 
distributed free. See ICAP, NEW ZEALAND EMISSIONS TRADING SCHEME 3 (2018). Between 
2008 and 2012, each participant received a free allocation equal to its negotiated emissions target. 
Since 2013 the allocation process has been similar to that of the EU ETS. See ICAP, SWISS ETS 
2 (2018). As baseline-and-credit systems, participants in the Alberta and Tokyo trading systems 
effectively receive a free allowance allocation equal to their baseline. The Chinese pilot trading 
systems distribute virtually all allowances for free. See Zhe Deng et al., supra note 11, at 994 tbl.1. 
 164.  See, e.g., Guri Bang et al., supra note 29, at 24–25; Caron et al., supra note 63, at 32–33; 
Danny Cullenward, The Limits of Administrative Law as Regulatory Oversight in Linked Carbon 
Markets, 33 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 1, 17–18 (2015). 
 165.  See N.Z. MINISTRY FOR THE ENV’T, supra note 41, at 40 (“The New Zealand ETS 
appears to have contributed, but only minimally, to changes in behavior and decisions that have 
reduced net emissions below business-as-usual levels.”); see generally Leining et al., supra note 
152 (discussing the history of the New Zealand ERS, outcomes, and pitfalls). 
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regulated facility across any of the sectors except the pulp and paper 
industry.”166 
RGGI has been assessed from several perspectives. During 2009–
15, electric power CO2 emissions and electricity prices declined in 
RGGI states, while in other states, emissions and prices increased.167 
Between 2009 and 2012, RGGI is estimated to have been responsible 
for about half of the decline in the region’s fossil-fired generating plant 
emissions.168 Lower natural gas prices, other environmental policies, 
and the 2009 recession were responsible for the rest.169 Use of auction 
revenue for energy efficiency, renewable energy, and other measures 
also contributed to the emission reductions.170 Part of the emissions 
reduction may have been offset by higher emissions in neighboring 
states. 171  RGGI is providing positive economic impacts and public 
health benefits while meeting its emission reduction objectives.172 
Reviews of the Swiss ETS conclude that the pressure on 
participants to reduce their CO2 emissions has practically vanished due 
to the abundant supply and consequent low prices of allowances.173 The 
 
 166.  Deepak Rajagopal, Firm Behaviors and Emissions under Emissions Intensity 
Regulation: Evidence from Alberta’s Specific Gas Emitters Regulation 1 (Oct. 17, 2014) (on file 
with UCLA Inst. Of Env’t & Sustainability, Working Paper Series) 
https://escholarship.org/uc/item/5t40p9ht. 
 167.  JORDAN STUTT ET AL., ACADIA CTR., REGIONAL GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE 
STATUS REPORT: PART MEASURING SUCCESS 9 (2016). 
 168.  See Murray & Maniloff, supra note 8, at 588 (“[E]missions would be 24% higher in the 
region if the RGGI program were not in effect . . . about half of the region’s reductions can be 
attributable directly to the RGGI program.”). 
 169.  Id. at 583. 
 170.  Id. at 582. 
 171.  See Harrison Fell & Peter Maniloff, Leakage in Regional Environmental Policy: The 
Case of the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, 87 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 1, 17 (2018) 
(“[R]educed generation in the RGGI region was not compensated for by increase in gas-fired 
generation in the area, but rather RGGI led to an increase in generation from the areas 
surrounding RGGI.”). 
 172.  See PAUL J. HIBBARD ET AL., ANALYSIS GRP., THE ECONOMIC IMPACTS OF THE 
REGIONAL GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE ON NINE NORTHEAST AND MID-ATLANTIC STATES 
49 (2015) (“[M]arket-based programs are providing positive economic impacts while meeting 
emission objectives.”); MICHELLE MANION ET AL., ABT ASSOCS., ANALYSIS OF THE PUBLIC 
HEALTH IMPACTS OF THE REGIONAL GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE, 2009–2014 1–3 (2017) 
(“The RGGI program improved air quality throughout the Northeast states and created major 
benefits to public health and productivity, including avoiding hundreds of premature deaths and 
tens of thousands of lost work days.”). 
 173.  FED. OFF. FOR THE ENV’T, EVALUATION OF INCENTIVE EFFECT OF EMISSIONS 
TRADING SCHEME 9 (2015); see ZHAW ZURICH U. OF APPLIED SCI.—SCH. OF MGMT. & L., 
SWISS EMISSIONS TRADING SCHEME CH ETS 5 (2018) (“The high amount of emission allowances 
allocated free of charge in combination with the currently low prices per unit provide little 
incentive for companies to implement reduction measures.”). 
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supply has been increased by the closure of a large emitter and the 
availability of imported compliance units. The situation is aggravated 
by uncertainties related to banking of surplus allowances and the 
possible link with the EU ETS (now agreed). 
Not surprisingly, the EU ETS, the oldest and largest GHG ETS, 
has been the subject of the most numerous evaluations. 174  The 
European Environment Agency and, in recent years, the European 
Commission publish annual reports on its operation. 175  Numerous 
attempts to estimate the emission reductions achieved have been 
published over the past decade. These are summarized in Table 11. The 
table shows two groups of studies: studies that estimate the emission 
reductions achieved by the EU ETS, and estimates of national emission 
reductions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 174.  See generally NORIKO FUJIWARA, META-ANALYSIS OF CLIMATE CHANGE POLICY 
EVALUATIONS IN THE EU AND MEMBER STATES (2017); Sean Healy et al., Review of Literature 
on EU ETS Performance: A Literature Review on GAP Analysis of Policy Evaluations (Öko-
Institut, Working Paper No. 2/2015, 2015). 
 175.  See generally Commission Report on the Functioning of the European Carbon Market, 
COM (2017) 48 final (Feb. 1, 2017); European Env’t Agency, Rep. No. 18/2017, Trends and 
Projections in the EU ETS in 2017: The EU Emissions Trading System in Numbers (2017), 
https://www.eea.europa.eu/publications/trends-and-projections-EU-ETS-2017; ANDREI MARCU 
ET AL., EUROPEAN ROUNDTABLE ON CLIMATE CHANGE AND SUSTAINABLE TRANSITION ET 
AL., THE 2018 STATE OF THE EU ETS REPORT (2018). 
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Table 11. Estimates of the emission reductions achieved by the EU 
ETS176 
Time 
Period Methodology 
Emission 
Reductions 
Study 
2005–
2007 
2008–
2012 
2005–
2006 
BAU = pre-2005 
trend for emissions 
intensity reduction, 
about -1%/year 
50 to 100 
MtCO2/y
ear 
 Ellerman and 
Buchner, 
2008177 
2005–
2007 
Ellerman and 
Buchner 
methodology. Same 
result, expressed 
differently 
2 to 5% 
of 
emissions 
 Ellerman, et 
al. 2010178 
2005–
2006 
Fuel switching 
emission reductions 
using a power sector 
model 
75 
MtCO2/ 
year 
 Delarue, et 
al., 2008179 
2005–
2007 
Panel data 
econometric analysis 
used to estimate 
BAU emissions 
247 
MtCO2 
over 3 
years 
 Anderson and 
DiMaria, 
2011180 
 
 176.  Difference in difference estimates a relationship between the emissions of ETS plants 
and plants not subject to the ETS. These non-ETS plants are usually smaller plants in the same 
industry and serve as the control group. Difference in difference looks at both groups during a 
period prior to the start of the ETS and uses this relationship to estimate business-as-usual 
emissions of the ETS plants after the ETS starts using actual data for control group plants. Thus, 
the estimated emissions reflect actual economic conditions, fuel prices, and other policies; 
therefore, the difference between the estimated and actual emissions is due to the ETS. For a 
technical description of the methodology, see Sebastian Petrick & Ulrich J. Wagner, The Impact 
of Carbon Trading on Industry: Evidence from German Manufacturing Firms 7–11 (Verein für 
Socialpolitik, No. C11-V3, 2014) and Marit E. Klemetsen et al., The Impacts of the EU ETS on 
Norwegian Plants’ Environmental and Economic Performance 22–24 (Statistics Nor., Discussion 
Paper No. 833, 2016). 
 177.  A. Denny Ellerman & Barbara K. Buchner, Over-Allocation or Abatement? A 
Preliminary Analysis of the EU ETS Based on the 2005–06 Emissions Data, 41 ENVTL. & 
RESOURCE ECON. 267, 286 (2008). 
 178.  A. DENNY ELLERMAN ET AL., PRICING CARBON: THE EUROPEAN UNION EMISSIONS 
TRADING SCHEME 191 (2010). 
 179.  Erik Delarue et al., Fuel Switching in the Electricity Sector Under the EU ETS: Review 
and Prospective, 134 J. ENERGY ENGINEERING 40 (2008). 
 180.  Barry Anderson & Corrado Di Maria, Abatement and Allocation in the Pilot Phase of 
the EU ETS, 48 ENV’T. & RESOURCE ECON. 83, 97 (2011). 
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Time 
Period 
Methodology 
Emission 
Reductions 
Study 
2005–
2007 
2008–
2012 
2005–
2008 
Compares 2005-06 
and 2007-08 
reductions using 
data for 2,101 firms 
 Phase II 
led to 
reduct-
ions  
Abrell, et al., 
2011181 
2005–
2009 
Ellerman and 
Buchner 
methodology Phase 
I results are base for 
Phase II 
Intensity 
1%/ 
year 
lower  
Intensity 
1 to 
5%/yr 
lower 
Egenhofer, et 
al., 2011182 
2005–
2010 
Analysis of 
allowance allocation, 
trade and surrender 
by installation 
 More 
stringent 
Kettner, et al., 
2011183 
2005–
2012 
Econometric 
analysis of the 
impact of the 
recession on 
emissions  
33 to 41 MtCO2 over 
8 years due to ETS; 
12% of total  
Bel and 
Joseph, 
2015184 
2005–
2012 
Econometric 
analysis for a panel 
of EU countries 
Up to 10% (100 
MtCO2) due to 
carbon price. Rest 
due to other policies 
and recession  
 
 
Gloaguen and 
Alberola, 
2013185 
 
 181.  Jan Abrell et al., Assessing the Impact of the EU ETS Using Firm Level Data 15 (Bruegel 
Univ., Working Paper No. 2011/08, 2011). 
 182.  CHRISTIAN EGENHOFER ET AL., CTR. FOR EUR. POL’Y STUD., THE EU EMISSIONS 
TRADING SYSTEM AND CLIMATE POLICY TOWARDS 2050: REAL INCENTIVES TO REDUCE 
EMISSIONS AND DRIVE INNOVATION? 11 (2011). 
 183.  Claudia Kettner et al., The EU Emission Trading Scheme Allocation Patterns and 
Trading Flows 3 (Austrian Inst. of Econ. Research, WIFO Working Papers No. 402, 2011). 
 184.  Germà Bel & Stephan Joseph, Emission Abatement: Untangling the Impacts of the EU 
ETS and the Economic Crisis, 49 ENERGY ECON. 531, 538 (2015). 
 185.  Olivier Gloaguen & Emilie Alberola, Assessing the Factors Behind CO2 Emissions 
Changes over the Phases 1 and 2 of the EU ETS: An Econometric Analysis 28 (CDC Climat 
Research, Working Paper No. 2013–15, 2013). 
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Time 
Period 
Methodology 
Emission 
Reductions 
Study 
2005–
2007 
2008–
2012 
2005–
2014 
Comparison of 
energy intensity 
decline pre and post 
2005 
Average decline 
3%/year vs about 
1%/year to 2004  
Ellerman, et 
al. 2016186 
 National Estimates  
2005–
2007 
Ellerman and 
Buchner 
methodology Upper 
bound estimates 
85.5 to 
121.9 
MtCO2e 
 Ellerman and 
Feilhauer, 
2008187 
2001–
2013 
Norway Difference 
in difference with 
plant data 
Nil* Signif-
icant 
Klemetsen, et 
al., 2016188 
1999–
2010 
France Difference in 
difference estimates 
with plant data 
Insignif-
icant 
15.7% 
since 
2005  
Wagner, et 
al., 2014189 
2003–
2010 
Lithuania Difference 
in difference 
estimates with plant 
data 
Nil  Nil Jaraite and 
DiMaria, 
2016190 
1995–
2010 
Germany difference 
in difference ests. w/ 
plant data 
Nil 20% 
reduction  
Petrick and 
Wagner, 
2014191 
 
 186.  A. Denny Ellerman et al., The European Union Emissions Trading System: Ten Years 
and Counting, 10 REV. ENVTL. ECON. & POL’Y 89, 96–103 (2016). 
 187.  A. Denny Ellerman & Stephan Feilhauer, A Top-Down and Bottom-Up Look at 
Emissions Abatement in Germany in Response to the EU ETS 13 (Mass. Inst. of Tech. Ctr. for 
Energy & Envtl. Pol’y Res., Working Paper No. 08-017, 2008). 
 188.  See Klemetsen et al., supra note 176, at 38 (“Our estimation results suggest that the ETS 
may have led to significant emission reductions in the second phase (2008–12). However, we do 
not find any significant effects in the first phase (2005–07) or the third phase (2013).”). Also note 
that although Norway had an ETS with a design very similar to that of the EU ETS, it was not 
part of the EU ETS until 2008. 
 189.  Ulrich J. Wagner et al., The Causal Effects of the European Union Emissions Trading 
Scheme: Evidence from French Manufacturing Plants 20 (2014) (on file with IZA Inst. of Labor 
Econ.), http://conference.iza.org/conference_files/EnvEmpl2014/martin_r7617.pdf. 
 190.  J rate Jaraite & Corrado Di Maria, Did the EU ETS Make a Difference? An Empirical 
Assessment Using Lithuanian Firm-Level Data, 37 ENERGY J. 1, 20 (2016). 
 191.  Sebastian Petrick & Ulrich J. Wagner, The Impact of Carbon Trading on Industry: 
Evidence from German Manufacturing Firms 34 (Kiel Inst. for the World Econ., Working Paper 
No. 1912, 2014). 
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These studies indicate that the ETS reduced emissions relative to 
business-as-usual during its first phase. Those reductions appear to 
have been achieved mainly through fuel switching and efficiency 
measures in the power sector (about 60% of total emissions covered), 
with limited contributions by the industrial sectors. 
Emission reductions during the second phase were larger, with 
industrial facilities contributing to the results. Other policies and 
economic developments make it very difficult to estimate the share of 
the reductions attributable to the ETS. During this period, EU 
implemented policies to achieve a 20% share of total energy 
consumption from renewable energy and a 20% improvement in 
energy efficiency to help achieve its target of a 20% reduction of GHG 
emissions from 1990 levels by 2020. A major recession in 2009 and 
changes to the relative prices of coal and natural gas over the period 
also affected emissions. 192  Gloaguen and Alberola attribute a 
maximum of 10% of the reductions to the carbon price, but the ETS 
may also impact their energy efficiency variable, which accounts for a 
further 10% to 20% of the reductions. Results based on plant data, 
which compare emissions of ETS participants with those of plants not 
covered by the ETS, suggest the ETS contributed to the emission 
reductions achieved during Phase II. 
Other impacts of the ETS, including employment, output, 
investment, profits, prices, leakage, and innovation, also have been the 
subject of multiple studies.193  In general, they find minimal, if any, 
adverse impacts together with shifts in investment, employment, and 
innovation toward less emitting activities. 
D. Summary 
We were able to compile emissions data for 10 ETSs covering 45 
jurisdictions. Actual emissions declined for at least six of those ETSs. 
Emissions covered by the Alberta and New Zealand systems increased. 
It is clear that the 2009 recession, changes in the relative prices of coal 
 
 192.  See Nicholas Berghmans et al., The CO2 Emissions of the European Power Sector: 
Economic Drivers and the Climate-Energy Policies’ Contribution 12 (CDC Climat Research, 
Working Paper No. 2014-17, 2014) (showing natural gas prices rising while coal prices declined 
slightly, providing an incentive for greater use of coal and hence increased emissions). 
 193.  Several studies provide helpful summaries. See, e.g., Ralf Martin et al., The Impact of the 
European Union Emissions Trading Scheme on Regulated Firms: What is the Evidence after Ten 
Years? 10 REV. ENVTL. ECON. & POL’Y 129, 136–45 (2015); Tim Liang et al., Assessing the 
Effectiveness of the EU Emissions Trading System (Ctr. for Climate Change Econ. & Pol’y, 
Working Paper No. 126, 2013). 
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and natural gas, renewable energy and energy efficiency initiatives, and 
the nuclear plant shutdown following the great east Japan earthquake 
and tsunami have had significant impacts on the emissions covered by 
several of the ETSs. 
All of the ETSs for which data are available have accumulated 
surplus allowances—some equivalent to more than a year’s emissions. 
Most of those ETSs have implemented measures to reduce the surplus. 
In many cases, however, emissions continue to decline faster than the 
cap. Several of the ETSs have adopted market stability mechanisms to 
routinely remove surplus allowances from the market and inject 
allowances into the market when they are scarce. Data on the 
performance of these mechanisms are not yet available. 
Other studies have attempted to estimate the emission reductions 
that can be attributed to the ETS. Murray and Maniloff estimate that 
RGGI was responsible for about half of the emissions reduction 
between 2009 and 2012. Several studies of the EU ETS suggest that 
emissions were reduced relative to business-as-usual during 2005–07, 
with most of the reductions due to fuel switching and efficiency 
measures in the power sector. Numerous studies conclude that the 
2008–12 reductions were larger, with industrial facilities contributing 
to the results. 
Assessments of the New Zealand and Swiss systems conclude that 
uncertainty adversely affected their performance. The uncertainty 
created by the challenge to the legality of the California ETS reduced 
the allowances sold at the May 2016 auction by almost 90%. The court 
decision affirmed the legality of the ETS. 
VI. COMPARISON OF ACTUAL CARBON TAXES AND GHG ETSS 
Existing carbon taxes and GHG ETSs are compared in Table 12 
using the criteria proposed in Section III. ETSs perform better than 
carbon taxes on the principal criteria. Actual emission reductions are 
more common for ETSs, and the marginal cost is generally 
substantially lower. On average, ETSs cover a slightly larger share of 
the jurisdiction’s GHG emissions. That assessment is subject to several 
caveats: First, some carbon taxes achieve emission reductions at 
marginal costs comparable to those of ETSs. Additionally, a few ETSs 
have not achieved emission reductions, and the observed emission 
reductions cannot be attributed solely to the ETS or tax. Evidence 
presented in section IV.B.3 suggests that other policies contributed 
significantly to the reductions of non-ETS emissions achieved by 
European countries with carbon taxes. Studies reviewed in section V.C 
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indicate that other policies and economic developments likewise have 
helped reduce emission covered by GHG ETSs. Finally, ETSs and 
taxes are not included in the comparison due to lack of data.  
 Table 12. Comparison of Existing Carbon Taxes and GHG ETSs 
Criterion Carbon Taxes GHG ETSs 
Principal 
Criteria 
  
Environmental 
effectiveness: 
Reduction of 
actual 
emissions in 
the jurisdiction 
6 of 17 taxes in 12 
jurisdictions have 
reduced actual 
emissions since the start 
of the tax. Other 
policies probably 
responsible for the 
reductions of most 
European taxes. 
At least six of ten ETSs 
covering forty-one 
jurisdictions have 
reduced actual 
emissions since 
inception of the ETS. 
Other policies 
contribute, but their 
share generally is not 
known. 
Shares of the 
jurisdiction’s emissions 
covered ranges from 3% 
to 70% with a weighted 
average of 45.7% 
Shares of the 
jurisdiction’s emissions 
covered ranges from 
18% to 85% with a 
weighted average of 
48.0% 
Cost-
effectiveness: 
low marginal 
abatement cost 
Tax rates range from < 
USD 1 to USD 140 with 
a weighted average of 
USD 13.04 per tCO2 
Allowance prices range 
from < USD 1 to USD 
24 with a weighted 
average of USD 7.79 
per tCO2 
Secondary 
Criteria 
  
Economic 
efficiency: Low 
price volatility 
Tax rates are stable but 
can change with 
relatively little notice 
Many ETSs include 
provisions to enhance 
price stability and larger 
ETSs tend to have 
options and/or futures 
contracts that enable 
sources to obtain 
allowances at an agreed 
price at a future date 
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Criterion Carbon Taxes GHG ETSs 
Economic 
efficiency: 
price signal 
commitment 
into the future 
Commitments to future 
tax rates tend to be 
limited to 3 to 5 years 
usually when the tax is 
introduced. Annual rate 
increases occur about 
60% of the time. 
Commitments to cap 
reductions and price 
stability provisions often 
span 5 to 8 years and 
with emission reduction 
targets to 2030 or 2050  
Economic 
efficiency: 
harmonization 
of marginal 
costs across 
jurisdictions 
International 
harmonization of tax 
rates is very complex 
and has never been 
attempted in practice 
Linking ETSs is 
common but almost 
always subject to 
quantitative limits so 
price convergence is 
limited. Limits are 
becoming more 
stringent. 
Public finance: 
revenue raised 
Carbon taxes raise far 
more revenue that 
ETSs. Most tax revenue 
is used for tax cuts and 
rebates or general 
revenue. Uses vary 
widely by jurisdiction 
and change over time. 
ETSs raise less revenue 
than taxes because in 
many ETSs most 
allowances are 
distributed free to EITE 
sources. Most revenue is 
used for green purposes, 
but this varies widely 
across jurisdictions. 
Public finance: 
cross-
jurisdiction 
revenue flows 
Cross-jurisdiction 
revenue flows occur 
through government 
budgets 
In addition to 
government transfers, 
linking ETSs leads to 
cross-jurisdiction 
revenue flows 
Administrative 
issues: 
institutional 
capacity 
Carbon taxes are often 
relatively easy to 
implement because 
most jurisdictions 
already collect taxes on 
fossil fuels 
An ETS creates several 
new institutional 
requirements 
Administrative 
issues: 
administrative 
costs 
 
Administrative costs are 
usually lower for carbon 
taxes  
Administrative costs are 
usually higher for ETSs 
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Criterion Carbon Taxes GHG ETSs 
Administrative 
issues: 
difficulty of 
making 
adjustments to 
rules 
Changes to the tax rate 
or coverage can 
typically be made as 
part of a budget 
Changes to the rules 
governing an ETS tend 
to require changes to 
regulations and/or 
legislation which often 
involves a process of 
notice and consultation  
Administrative 
issues: 
minimization 
of corruption 
Data on tax avoidance 
are not available 
Information on the scale 
of different forms of 
corruption for ETSs is 
not available. 
 
Comparison of changes in non-ETS emissions in European 
countries with and without a carbon tax since 2008 suggests that the 
carbon taxes have had a limited impact in most of those jurisdictions. 
Other assessments of carbon taxes confirm that impression. Tax 
exemptions, relatively low tax rates (which lead to even smaller price 
changes), and modest changes to the tax rates limit the reduction of 
actual emissions achieved by carbon taxes. Most of those carbon taxes 
apply to residential, commercial, and transportation uses of fossil 
fuels—uses where consumers may not respond promptly or fully to the 
price changes induced by the tax. 
More research is needed to improve instrument design. In the case 
of a carbon tax, it is conceptually clear that the tax rate must rise over 
time to adjust for inflation, increased income, technological change, 
and other factors to achieve further emission reductions. In practice 
rate increases for most carbon taxes have exceeded the rate of 
inflation, but for most of the taxes, that has not been enough to reduce 
emissions. The huge variation in tax rate changes and rates of emission 
reduction/increase indicate that this relationship is not well understood 
in practice. 
Denmark, Iceland, Ireland, Norway, Slovenia (fluorinated gases 
tax only), Switzerland, and Liechtenstein regularly increase the tax rate 
at one- to three-year intervals; and 
British Columbia, France, Japan, and the UK introduced carbon 
taxes with rapid (over 30%/year) tax rate increases for periods of three 
to five years. Such rapid tax increases probably are not sustainable.194 
 
 194.  The tax rates specified in the French legislation—€56/tCO2 in 2020 and €100/tCO2 in 
2030—imply that the average annual rate at which the tax rate rises falls from 31% for 2015-2020 
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In British Columbia, they were followed by a five-year rate freeze. In 
the UK, the tax rate was frozen after three years. What will happen in 
other jurisdictions is not yet known. 
Many of the ETSs accumulate significant quantities of surplus 
(banked) allowances and offset credits. A growing allowance bank 
indicates that emissions can be reduced faster than the rate at which 
the cap is declining. Since a growing bank depresses the market price, 
additional reductions can be achieved at relatively low cost. Many 
ETSs have implemented measures to reduce the surplus. Several ETSs 
have adopted a market stability reserve to remove excess allowances 
from the market when prices are low and release additional allowances 
into the market when prices are high. The effectiveness of those 
mechanisms will need to be assessed. 
All jurisdictions with a carbon tax or GHG ETS have also 
implemented other policies that affect the emissions of sources covered 
by the instrument. Other policies can be justified if they have different 
objectives (e.g., short- vs. long-term emission reductions), they target 
different market failures (e.g., pollution abatement vs. technology 
innovation), or the carbon price is below the socially optimal level.195 
The other policies may not cover the same sources and may affect them 
differentially, thus generating interaction effects.196 Although having 
multiple policies to reduce GHG emissions is inefficient, public 
opinion favors non-price policies so a portfolio of policies may be 
needed to sustain political support for price instruments.197 
In the case of an ETS, any reductions achieved by other policies 
theoretically can be fully offset by higher emissions within the ETS cap, 
resulting in a higher cost for the same emission reduction.198 In the EU, 
subsidies for renewable energy are responsible for most of the emission 
 
to less than 14% for 2015–30. See Loi 2015-992 du 17 août 2015 relative à la transition énergétique 
pour la croissance verte [Law 2015-992 of August 17, 2015 on Energy Transition for Green 
Growth], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.] [OFFICAL GAZETTE OF 
FRANCE], Aug. 18, 2015, p. 14263. 
 195.  Michael Mehling & Endre Tvinnereim, Carbon Pricing and the 1.5°C Target: Near-Term 
Decarbonisation and the Importance of an Instrument Mix, 12 CARBON & CLIMATE L. REV. 50, 
57–59 (2018); Michael Hoel, Second-Best Climate Policy 2–3 (Univ. of Oslo, Dep’t of Econ., 
Memorandum No. 04/2012, 2012), http://www.sv.uio.no/econ/english/research/unpublished-
works/working-papers/2012/memo042012.html; WORLD BANK CARBON PRICING LEADERSHIP 
COAL., supra note 77, at 15–24. 
 196.  See generally Wytze van der Gaast et al., Effects of Interactions Between EU Climate and 
Energy Policies (CARISMA, Working Documents No. 3, 2016) (discussing various case studies 
of the interactions between energy policies within different European countries). 
 197.  BARRY G. RABE, CAN WE PRICE CARBON? 24, 194, 208 (2018). 
 198.  Schmalensee & Stavins, supra note 12, at 17–18. 
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reductions in the power sector.199 In the German power sector, the 
combination of the renewable energy policy and EU ETS leads to 
larger emissions reductions due to their impacts on the merit order of 
fossil-fired generating units. 200  In practice, some of the emission 
reductions achieved by other policies are captured by the 
removal/cancellation of surplus allowances and more rapid reduction 
of the emissions cap. 
With respect to the economic efficiency criteria, carbon taxes 
provide better short-term price stability but poorer long-term price 
signals than ETSs. However, price stability provisions and, where 
available, forward contracts and options reduce short-term price 
volatility for ETSs. A carbon tax that has a track record of annual or 
biannual rate adjustments probably provides a longer-term price signal 
comparable to that of the five to eight-year cap reduction commitments 
of many ETSs. 
Harmonization of tax rates or allowance prices only occurs where 
multiple jurisdictions are fully linked or part of the same ETS, as in the 
case of the EU ETS, RGGI and California/Quebec. Other ETSs have 
links but they are subject to qualitative and quantitative restrictions, 
which limit price convergence. Harmonization of effective tax rates 
would be very complex in practice and has not been attempted. 
Carbon taxes raise significantly more revenue that ETSs. Indeed, 
that has been an important motivation for implementing a carbon tax 
in some jurisdictions. Many ETSs distribute most of their allowances 
free for two reasons: to ease the cost of adjusting to the new regulation, 
and to protect the competitiveness of EITE sources.  
Free allowances provide an incentive to reduce emissions but 
reduce the financial cost of compliance, because a source whose 
emissions exceed its free allocation must purchase allowances to cover 
the excess, and a source whose emissions are less than its free allocation 
can sell its surplus allowances. Carbon taxes address these issues with 
exemptions, differential tax rates, and rebates. At least 44% of the 
carbon tax revenue is used for tax cuts and rebates. 201  EITE 
 
 199.  Nicholas Berghmans et al., The CO2 Emissions of the European Power Sector: Economic 
Drivers and the Climate-Energy Policies’ Contribution 27 (Inst. for Climate Econ., Working Paper 
No. 2014-17, 2014).  
 200.  Hannes Weigt et al., CO2 Abatement from Renewable Energy Injections in the German 
Electricity Sector: Does a CO2 Price Help? 27 (KULeuven Energy Inst., Working Paper EN2012-
002, 2012). 
 201.  Carl & Fedor, supra note 59, at 52. The percentages reported do not sum to 100. When 
the percentages are calculated to sum to 100, roughly 50% goes to tax cuts and rebates. Rebates 
probably go to entities, such EITE firms, subject to the tax while tax cuts are reductions of other 
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exemptions might contribute to the lower share of emissions covered 
by taxes. 
The ability of ETSs to facilitate cross jurisdictional financial 
transfers via allowance/offset purchases is interesting, but ETSs that 
allowed such imports, including the EU, Switzerland and New 
Zealand, have severely restricted their use. The newer ETSs in China 
and South Korea prohibit or tightly control imports of allowances and 
offsets from foreign jurisdictions. 
A carbon tax is usually easier to implement and less costly to 
administer than an ETS. An ETS requires a new administrative 
infrastructure including: an emissions MRV system; institutions to 
distribute allowances, enforce compliance, and monitor the allowance 
market; and a computer registry to track allowance holdings. A carbon 
tax is usually applied to fossil fuels which are already subject to various 
taxes. Adding a carbon tax may involve changes to the MRV system 
and compliance enforcement. Extending the carbon tax beyond fossil 
fuels increases its complexity and administrative cost. Although the 
administrative costs of an ETS are generally considered to be higher 
than those for a carbon tax, the proliferation of ETSs indicates 
administrative costs are not a significant barrier. 
It is interesting to note that ETSs are much more common for sub-
national jurisdictions than carbon taxes despite the extra 
administrative capacity they require. The sub-national ETSs are found 
in Canada, China and the US, and the choice of an ETS might be 
influenced by the constitutional distribution of taxing authority in 
those countries. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Carbon taxes and GHG ETSs are becoming increasingly common 
and now cover over 20% of global emissions. The first carbon taxes 
date from 1990 and the first GHG ETS still operating dates from 2005. 
Since 2005, implementation of ETSs has spread more rapidly. They 
now cover substantially more jurisdictions and more emissions than 
carbon taxes. Their designs vary widely. The instrument choice and 
design are affected by circumstances unique to the jurisdiction, such as 
its emissions profile, constitutional provisions, economic structure, and 
other policies. 
 
 
taxes. Carl and Fedor group them even though the public finance and economic impacts are quite 
different. 
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At the end of 2015, 17 GHG ETSs were operational in 55 
jurisdictions, while 18 jurisdictions collected at least one carbon tax. 
Despite the number of taxes and ETSs implemented and the fact that 
several have been in effect for over a decade, relatively little is known 
about their actual performance. 
Both carbon taxes and GHG ETSs have demonstrated that they 
can reduce emissions from business-as-usual. This paper proposes and 
applies the more stringent criterion of a reduction of actual emissions 
subject to the instrument. That approach permits assessment of more 
carbon taxes over longer time periods. It is also more consistent with 
the emissions targets of most jurisdictions that have implemented a 
carbon tax and/or ETS. The business-as-usual emissions reductions 
achieved are rarely sufficient to lower actual emissions. 
So far, reductions of actual emissions are more common for ETSs 
than taxes, and, on average, allowance prices are lower than carbon tax 
rates. The observed emission reductions cannot be attributed solely to 
the ETS or tax. Other policies and other developments affect the 
emissions covered by the instruments. The effects of the 2009 economic 
recession and the nuclear plant shutdown after the great east Japan 
earthquake and tsunami are evident in the data. Additionally, data for 
EU countries suggest that the policies to improve energy efficiency and 
increase the supply of renewable energy have contributed to the 
declining emissions subject to both carbon taxes and the EU ETS. 
More rigorous analysis is needed to determine the emission reductions 
that can be attributed to the instruments. 
The smaller emission reductions with higher marginal costs for 
carbon taxes may reflect the sources to which carbon taxes and GHG 
ETSs are applied. Carbon taxes tend to apply to fossil fuels with limited 
coverage of energy and industrial sources while the opposite is true for 
ETSs. The low price elasticity of demand for fossil fuels means that 
reduction of the associated emissions may require larger price changes 
(higher carbon taxes) and take longer than energy and industrial 
emission reductions covered by ETSs. 
Measures to improve effectiveness are being developed and 
diffused more quickly for ETSs than for carbon taxes. Most ETSs have 
increased the share of allowances auctioned, adopted declining 
emissions caps, specified future caps and floor prices several years into 
the future, shifted to benchmarking for free EITE allowances, reduced 
the accessibility of foreign offset credits, and established market 
stability reserves. Experience has been shared bilaterally and via 
dedicated institutions including the International Carbon Action 
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Partnership (ICAP), Western Climate Initiative, and Partnership for 
Market Readiness (PMR).202 
In contrast, there has been virtually no change to the design of 
carbon taxes. Adjustments to the tax rate are unpredictable after the 
introductory period in most jurisdictions. We found no jurisdiction that 
regularly reports emissions by sources subject to its carbon tax(es). 
Very few jurisdictions regularly assess the effectiveness of the tax in 
achieving their emission reduction targets. Moreover, there is little 
evidence of shared learning based on experience, although the 
Partnership for Market Readiness is developing materials on the 
design and implementation of carbon taxes. 
Interesting patterns for which we do not have an explanation 
include: 
Most carbon taxes are implemented by national jurisdictions in 
countries that also have an ETS—countries that are part of the EU 
ETS and Switzerland. On the other hand, roughly the same number of 
countries that participate in the EU ETS do not have a carbon tax; and 
Despite the greater administrative infrastructure required by an 
ETS, they are much more common than carbon taxes for sub-national 
jurisdictions. That may reflect the constitutional distribution of taxing 
authority in Canada, China and the US. In any case, the extra 
administrative demands are not a significant practical barrier to 
implementation of an ETS. 
Topics that warrant further research to improve the effectiveness 
of these instruments include: the characteristics of a tax rate strategy 
that leads to actual emission reductions; the level of the tax rate needed 
to have an impact on emissions, the frequency and magnitude of tax 
rate changes needed to achieve continual reductions efficiently, and 
the commitments to future tax rates that provide credible price signals 
for mitigation investments; The most effective treatment of EITE 
sources under each instrument (is allocation of free allowances under 
an ETS more effective than an exemption/rebate under a tax?); and 
the design features of an effective ETS (do a commitment to a declining 
annual cap, price stability provisions, market stability reserve, links 
with other ETSs, or other features have a significant impact on the 
emission reductions achieved?) 
 
 
 
 202.  See generally THE EVOLUTION OF CARBON MARKETS: DESIGN AND DIFFUSION 
(Jørgen Wettestad & Lars H. Gulbrandsen eds., 2017). 
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Research on effective portfolios of price and non-price 
instruments is needed. All jurisdictions with a carbon tax or GHG ETS 
have also implemented other policies that affect the emissions of 
sources covered by the instrument. There are sound theoretical and 
practical reasons for using multiple price and non-price instruments to 
address climate change. Use of multiple instruments produces complex 
interactive and distributional effects. While economically inefficient, a 
portfolio of price and non-price policies may be needed to sustain 
political support for price instruments.203 
 Both carbon taxes and GHG ETSs have demonstrated that they 
can reduce emissions. Implementation of both instruments is 
spreading. Given evidence available from existing instruments, it is 
time to learn from that experience to make both more effective so that 
they can better contribute to the effort to reduce global GHG 
emissions. 
  
  
 
 203.  See RABE, supra note 197, at 24 (“[C]arbon pricing policies consistently have the most 
limited base of political support among a wide range of policy options to reduce carbon 
emissions.”). 
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 Annex 1. Tax Revenue, Tax Rate, and Estimated Emissions by 
Jurisdiction and Tax, 1991 to 2016 
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